| 1 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | | |
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| 2 | DISTRICT OF UTAH | | |
| 3 | CENTRAL DIVISION | | |
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| 5 | CRYSTAL LAGOONS U.S. CORP.,) | | |
| 6 | Plaintiff,) | | |
| 7 | vs.) Case No. 2:19-CV-796BSJ | | |
| 8 | CLOWARD H20, | | |
| 9 | Defendant.) | | |
| 10 |) | | |
| 11 | | | |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRUCE S. JENKINS | | |
| 14 | September 2, 2021 | | |
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| 16 | Claim Construction Hearing | | |
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September 2, 2021

10:00 a.m.

THE COURT: Good morning.

Why don't we go ahead in Crystal Lagoons U.S. Corp. versus Cloward H20. It is 2:19-C-796, here today calendered as a construction hearing to consider the concerns of each of the parties.

PROCEEDINGS

Those who are making appearances, if you will be good enough to make a record and tell us who you are and whom you represent.

To begin with I note that counsel had asked for a client to be able to Zoom in and that is fine. I should point out, of course, that the only record made is that by the official court reporter. So there is no recording on the part of anybody other than the official court reporter. It is that understanding that the Court has in reference to those who observe.

At any rate, those who are here as counsel for the litigants, if you will again make a record for us and tell us who you are and whom you represent.

MR. ZEULI: Good morning, Your Honor.

I am Tony Zeuli from the law firm of Merchant and Gould. I represent the plaintiff Crystal Lagoons in this matter. With me today as attorneys are Karen Beckman from

my law firm and also James Watson, local counsel from the Trask Britt firm. To my right is a client representative, Fernando Fishman, who is the owner and president of Crystal Lagoons and also the inventor in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ZEULI: Thank you.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Good morning, Your Honor.

Jared Braithwaite on behalf of Cloward H20,

L.L.C., the defendant. With me today is the president of

Cloward H20, Cory Cloward. I also have from my firm Alexis

Juergens accompanying me.

THE COURT: Okay. We're concerned, as you know, today primarily about language and the adequacy of language and the clarity of language. We're not dealing with any subject other than the language and the adequacy of the will claims as written to adequately convey the alleged claim and the extent of the claim of the inventor.

I think procedurally it would make sense if we had the defendant begin today. In looking at the language, we're all concerned with whether or not the language adequately conveys information. The information has to do with both the structure and the process and the application. Our job is to look at the language and our job today is not to construe the application of the language to the process or to the structure or the related matters. Our job is to

see if the language as language conveys information that is agreeable with the recipient here, the reader, so that we're talking about the same subject.

So I think it would be appropriate under the circumstances, looking at the questions raised, if the defendant took time to deal with his concern, if there is a concern, with the language that is of concern to him, after which we'll deal with the first concern. We'll have the defendant respond — that is the plaintiff respond through counsel, and then we'll deal with the second one and we'll deal with each one as we go, so that we can identify what defect or flaw or need may exist for clarity and simplicity so that we're all talking about the same thing.

So, counsel, why don't you start.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Permit me a moment. To the extent anything visual is needed, it will come out on the overhead.

THE CLERK: I think you're going to have to take your mask off. Thank you.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Good morning, Your Honor.

As I understand what the Court is asking, is we're not concerned today about applying the claims to the accused product, but rather determining what the meaning of claim terms are.

THE COURT: That is right.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: And so I think the most important aspect of this case is context. THE COURT: I agree with you. So it is. MR. BRAITHWAITE: That is what we're doing here on claim construction. The seminal cases on claim construction are the Markman case and the Phillips case, Markman from the Supreme Court establishing the procedure for claim construction, and Phillips from the Federal Circuit talking about what courts should generally look at, because the task here today is to understand what those of skill in the art would come to understand by reading the patent and reading the claims to understand what it is supposed to cover. THE COURT: I'm always interested in what skill and what art. MR. BRAITHWAITE: What we proposed, Your Honor, is that the person of skill in the art is someone with a bachelor's degree in civil engineering that would be familiar with and have some experience in building recreational water facilities, whether they be large

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bachelor's degree in civil engineering that would be
familiar with and have some experience in building
recreational water facilities, whether they be large
swimming pools, large wave pools, things of that nature.

There are kayaking training facilities and -
THE COURT: I want you to focus on the words of
the specific claims that you say are in need of some help.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I understand.

The first one I think that we briefed and that

we're going to address is the term walls. What would a person of skill in the art understand is a wall or would be encompassed within the meaning of the term wall. Again, this is where context is important, because I can talk about a long day in court and it is 6:00 in the afternoon and I have hit a wall. Well, I have not literally run into a wall. It is a form of speech to say that I'm tired and I'm exhausted.

So in one context such as exhaustion, wall might mean some sort of ethereal term of exhaustion, but that is not what we are talking about. We're talking about recreational water structures. What does wall mean in that context? What the court said is ultimately the interpretation of a term can only be determined and confirmed with the full understanding of what the inventor actually invented and intended to envelope with the claim. The construction stays true to the language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be in the end the correct construction.

Another aspect of what we're not doing today is looking at what --

THE COURT: What don't you understand about wall?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Let's move on to wall directly.

THE COURT: That is what you're focusing on.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes. Correct, Your Honor.

The context for this dispute and why it is even an issue for the Court to decide and determine what wall means is because on the one hand Crystal Lagoons' interpretation in this case has been that wall can be anything. It can be any surface of a water structure. It could be the wall. It could be the floor. It could be another portion of the floor. It could be the sloped floor. It could be any surface, and that does violence to the terms of the claims and is counter to the description of the patent and is not how anyone of skill in the art would understand the term wall.

That is why it is an issue is that the decision point for the Court is is the scope of the word wall anything, including the floor, or is it --

THE COURT: Well, why don't you describe your understanding of the structure.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Our understanding starts with the plain and ordinary definition that would be given by any layperson and that is consistent with how a person of skill in the art would view wall. I have a wall on the left hand and I have a wall over here and I have a wall behind Your Honor in the --

THE COURT: I understand that the function is contextual. Tell me your understanding of the context of the use of the term here.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: So the context of recreational water structures -- we can look at how people of skill in the art use these terms. In particular, before this case was ever filed, the defendant here, Cloward H2O, used the term wall and the term floor in their plans for the accused product. The wall is the vertical sidewalls to the structure and the floor is the bottom, what people would walk on, and that is a distinction that others of skill in the art would make as well.

What we have, on the other hand, from Crystal Lagoons is one of their employees, Ms. De la Cerda, she submitted a declaration saying wall is broader than that.

Look, I found a paper about bioswells --

THE COURT: No. Why don't you just tell me your trouble -- your trouble, if there is trouble, with wall.

Are we talking about the sides, the sides of the structure, the pond, the lake, the lagoon --

MR. BRAITHWAITE: That is --

THE COURT: -- the depression? What are we talking about?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: What we're talking about when we say wall, and what we think all those of skill in the art would understand by wall is the sides, the vertical sides.

THE COURT: That is your impression. Okay. Now does the claim say that?

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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes, the claims do say that.
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               THE COURT: Well, you don't have any trouble then
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     with that, do you?
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, yes. It is a dispute
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     because --
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               THE COURT: It might be a dispute, but it is a
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     dispute down the road. It is not a dispute on claim
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     construction. It says what it says.
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: I agree, Your Honor, and that is
     how the claim should be approached, but the problem we have
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     in this case is a dispute over the term scope of the wall.
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               THE COURT: Well, scope is a different question.
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     Meaning is what we're concerned with. We're concerned with
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     the use of words and what the word conveys, what is behind
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     the word.
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: Exactly. That is where the
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     parties have a dispute and that is the function of the Court
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     during claim construction to decide which understanding of
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     the term is correct.
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               THE COURT: Well, your understanding is sides.
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes, the substantial vertical
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     sides of the --
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               THE COURT: I don't know where substantial comes
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     from, but I understand your suggestion that --
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes, the sides.
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THE COURT: Okay. I will hear from them as to their attitude toward your suggestion as to the interpretation to make sure that you're operating on the same wavelength.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes. That is what we're trying to do here, and what I have prepared is to really show that those of skill in the art consistently do not understand a wall to refer to the floor, the bottom, what people walk on.

THE COURT: I don't have any trouble with that concept, frankly. Language is what it does and language has inherent defects, and I just want to make sure that you're talking about the same thing. If they want to suggest that a wall refers to something other than the sides, let them put that pitch.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I understand, Your Honor, that that question is technically teed up in our motion for summary judgment next month and we are not addressing that here today.

THE COURT: No, we are not.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: But I think what we're trying to do, and I will get on that same page so we have a common definition so in October when we approach that question there are not disputes where Crystal Lagoons is still saying, well, the floor can be a wall or the term wall --

THE COURT: Well, let's see what happens.

As you suggest and the function of language, and 1 2 it is one of the odd things in the rules that suggest 3 construction prior to the time that we engage in summary judgment or at the time we engage in pretrial, but I 4 5 understand your suggestion. 6 What is your next term besides wall? 7 MR. ZEULI: Excuse me, Your Honor. I think the 8 parties had agreed, if it is okay with the Court, that we 9 were going to go term by term. 10 THE COURT: Yes, we're going to do it term by term, but my question is what is your next term? 11 12 MR. BRAITHWAITE: The next term would be covered 13 with a plastic liner made of nonporous material able to be 14 thoroughly cleaned. 15 THE COURT: Now we're going to have counsel take a 16 moment and talk about walls. 17 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you. 18 MR. ZEULI: Good morning, Your Honor. Again, I'm 19 Tony Zeuli. I represent the plaintiff in this case. 20 Before I talk to you about walls, may I remove my 21 mask? 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. ZEULI: Thank you. 24 I failed to introduce, when we started this 25 morning, Bill Hamilton. Bill is seated right behind me and

Bill is a trial graphic specialist and he will be running 1 2 the PowerPoint. If the court would be kind enough to switch 3 over to the plaintiff's side, we will get talking about walls. 4 5 I also wanted to ask, and perhaps your assistant 6 is dealing with this, but our client representative who is 7 on the Zoom is unable to hear. We are wondering if there is 8 a microphone switch that would allow her to hear the 9 proceedings? 10 THE COURT: Is she the one viewing from outside? 11 MR. ZEULI: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Kim, have we got something that 13 would be helpful? 14 THE CLERK: We're trying to keep it on. 15 MR. ZEULI: Thank you very much for trying. 16 will go ahead and proceed and if you are able to join her, 17 wonderful, but, otherwise, I will talk to you. 18 THE CLERK: Our I.T. guy is going to come up. 19 They are there, but I don't know why it is muted. 20 MR. ZEULI: Thank you very much for looking. THE CLERK: We are doing the best we can right 21 22 now. 23 MR. ZEULI: Thank you very much. It is greatly 24 appreciated. If we could switch the dial to the plaintiff's

side, we will put our presentation up.

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While that is coming up, Your Honor, I just want to talk about a couple of things that the Court mentioned.

THE CLERK: I think we're good, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEULI: Good.

You know, one of the things Your Honor said is is there a defect in the patent? Do we need to address the clarity or simplicity? I believe at an earlier hearing the Court talked about when we got to this day that we would look to see was there ambiguity or confusion in the patent and the answer to that is no, there is not.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZEULI: Defendants, as is often the case in these patent litigation cases, will raise claim construction issues with the hopes of creating a noninfringement defense. The way that it works quite simply is that they take a look at something that is fairly straightforward on their product and they say, well, look, our liner, which we'll talk about next, or our walls are not vertical or they are wrinkly. If we can get the Judge to require that this word, wall, that is not modified by vertical, get them to change that, then we have got a defense.

The same thing with liner. They are wrinkly. If we can get the Judge to say that the liner can't be wrinkly and it has to be smooth or uniform, then they have a

defense. I think the Court was correct in thinking about this problem in the way that it does.

Let's look at the patent. What does the patent tell us, because that is the intrinsic evidence. Those cases that Mr. Braithwaite cited to you, Phillips and Markman, that is what they talk about. First we're going to look at the intrinsic evidence. Let's look to see what the intrinsic evidence says.

The word in the patent claim is walls. They want to add the word substantially vertical.

THE COURT: Well, it is nonexistent and I understand that, and as far as those words are concerned, we're stuck with what is there, and the question is what does that mean in the context of what we're talking about.

MR. ZEULI: It is a simple word that jurors will understand. It is a common English term that needs no definition.

THE COURT: You say it is plain and ordinary.

MR. ZEULI: Plain and ordinary.

THE COURT: I say the same thing and there is no construction necessary.

Let's move on to the second one.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

The next term is covered with a plastic liner made of a nonporous material able to be thoroughly cleaned. Now,

using the words of the claim, because this is where it matters, first it falls in the context of the claim, and there on about line 5 what it describes is a bottom and walls covered with a plastic liner made of a nonporous material able to be thoroughly cleaned. I think the issue here is what does covered mean, especially in light of the intrinsic evidence of the patent and the prosection history as described by the inventor and what doesn't it refer to.

So when it talks about the bottom covered with a plastic liner, that is distinguishing the floor of the structure from the sides, the walls covered with a plastic liner. But the purpose for it being covered is so that it can be cleaned. So on the one hand we're dealing with in this case a question of whether covered means not covered, it means plastic that is not exposed and that can't be cleaned.

The plain and ordinary meaning of able to be cleaned and --

THE COURT: Let me ask a direct question. We're talking about claims and we're talking about a description of the use of a plastic material at a particular location.

Is there some ambiguity on that?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: There is because of how the patent applicant described it. Crystal Lagoons has noted that we want the Court to construe it as a uniform plastic

liner, and Crystal Lagoons has gone on at length about wrinkles. This has nothing to do with wrinkles.

Here is the issue, Your Honor, is during the prosecution of this patent, so as the patent applicant was engaged in a back-and-forth with the patent office, a question came up over what does this cover and does it not cover. The examiner used a piece of prior art, something that predated the patent called the Cant patent.

THE COURT: Yes. That is the --

MR. BRAITHWAITE: So the patent examiner said, hey, look, here is a pool and it would have been obvious to put a plastic liner on the bottom so you don't get a patent. What the patent applicant said in response is important and provides context for what the patent applicant meant by plastic liner that is able to be thoroughly cleaned.

I have put on the screen what the patent application submitted to the patent office and their argument in response was, therefore, the system disclosed by Cant is incompatible with the present invention, as the present invention includes a bottom covered with a plastic liner that is able to be thoroughly cleaned, whereas the spray jets located in the bottom of the structure disclosed by Cant would not allow for normal functioning of a bottom cleaning device.

Spray jets that interrupt the plastic liner, and

that is what we mean by uniform, and if there are spray jets 1 2 or inlets that interrupt the plastic liner, the patent applicant says then you can't thoroughly clean the bottom. 3 So that is what makes us different than Cant and that is why 4 5 we should get a patent. 6 THE COURT: We don't have jets. 7 MR. BRAITHWAITE: We are dealing with jets, Your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: Are we talking about the Cant claim? MR. BRAITHWAITE: No, we are not talking about the 10 11 Cant claim. We are talking about the claims in the 514 12 patent and --13 THE COURT: Are there jets there? 14 MR. BRAITHWAITE: No, there are not. 15 THE COURT: We're talking about an absence of 16 jets? 17 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Correct. 18 They need to be absent, because the patent applicant said if there are inlets and jets, our claims 19 20 don't cover it and that is what makes us different than 21 Cant. 22 Well, okay. So what? THE COURT: 23 MR. BRAITHWAITE: The liner on the bottom -- that 24 is what we're asking the Court to decide is that the liner 25 on the bottom then needs to be uniform. That is what is

actually claimed is a uniform plastic liner. If the plastic 1 2 liner is interpreted as being broken up by spray jets and 3 inlets, then the recapturing ground that they gave up before the patent office, and that is part of our function on claim 4 5 construction is to say a person of skill in the art who read 6 the patent and read the prosecution history would not 7 understand that a plastic liner on the bottom that is broken 8 up all over the place with inlets and jets is a plastic 9 liner that is able to be thoroughly cleaned. 10 THE COURT: Okay. So what? 11 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, and it is not the question 12 for today, but when we move down the line --13 THE COURT: Well, let's look at it down the line. 14 Let's look at the questions for today. 15 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the interpretation 16 point, the claim interpretation point is what the claims 17 say. Is the liner able to be thoroughly cleaned? 18 THE COURT: Sure. MR. BRAITHWAITE: And so inherent in that term is 19 20 it can't be broken up with inlets and spray jets. 21 THE COURT: Ultimately we'll talk about whether 22 there is a violation here or whether there isn't. 23 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Correct. 24 THE COURT: They either suggest that your 25 defendant has in some fashion infringed or he hasn't.

That is contextual it seems to me and that is application it seems to me, and I think people understand in reading what is there that the impervious plastic liner does what it does at a particular location.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Right.

What we're trying to resolve, Your Honor, is down the road revisiting this idea of claims scope, because here is how I see things playing out. We come to October and then we're faced with arguments by Crystal Lagoons that, hey, a plastic liner able to be thoroughly cleaned, that can include spray jets all over the place. So they will be arguing --

THE COURT: Well, let's see if they make that argument. Let's not anticipate their argument. You're pointing out that the plastic liner needs to comply with what it says it is complying with.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that is pretty plain, isn't it?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I believe it is.

Here is the problem on claims construction. A lot of times party A comes to the court and says we have the plain and ordinary meaning, and party B comes to the court and says we have --

THE COURT: Well, that only exists if there is an ambiguity in the language that requires the so-called expert

help, the so-called those skilled in the art. Actually an 1 2 ordinary soul can read something and have an opinion 3 concurrent with the same opinion of one so-called skilled in the art. It is a matter of meaning and it is a matter of 4 5 having the symbols represent in your head and in his head 6 and in my head what it is that we're talking about. What 7 you're insisting here is that they need to have a plastic 8 liner that does what they say it does. 9 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Correct. And so --10 THE COURT: Let's see if he says they have got it 11 and what --12 MR. BRAITHWAITE: So on the defense side, in our 13 head the term covered by a plastic liner able to be 14 thoroughly cleaned means what we're envisioning is that it 15 is a uniform liner. It is not broken up by spray jets and 16 inlets and things. I think on this side it is already 17 pretty well established in the papers that on Crystal 18 Lagoons' side they are thinking in their head, no, it can 19 have holes all over the place for spray jets and inlets. 20 THE COURT: Well, let's see what they say. 21 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Okay. I think that is what 22 we're trying to resolve today. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. ZEULI: The Federal Circuit and the Court of

Appeals is where all these cases ultimately end up, right,

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and this one is probably headed there, too. Most patent cases I have been involved with over my 25 years, if claim constructions are involved, we're going to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals confirmed exactly what Your Honor just said, that the ordinary meaning can come from people like laypersons, including lay judges, and the term may be readily apparent even to lay judges. I think Your Honor understands that really what we have is an issue of application, not of construction. THE COURT: Yes. MR. ZEULI: The claim says plastic liner. going to be arguing about whether their plastic liner, because they certainly have a plastic liner, infringes that limitation, but that is in October. What they are asking you to do today is insert an adjective before plastic liner that --Tell me about your plastic liner. THE COURT: MR. ZEULI: Yes. I would like to tell you about that. THE COURT: I am interested in what it lines. Does it line the whole expanse? MR. ZEULI: It really --THE COURT: Is it placed on everything? MR. ZEULI: Yeah, it pretty much really does. Let me explain why. Before we talk about -- let

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me just show you one thing and then I want to talk to you 1 2 about that, because I think it is really helpful. 3 I didn't bring my clicker. Bill, could you go to the second slide on this? 4 5 I just wanted to point out to the Court, if you can see the screen, is that the claim language just says 6 7 covered with a plastic liner. They want to insert this 8 adjective uniform. 9 THE COURT: Well, I understand that. MR. ZEULI: What really is uniform? He was 10 11 talking about jets. I don't know what uniform means. 12 we have got a --13 THE COURT: You don't use jets, I take it? 14 MR. ZEULI: We do use jets. In fact, I'm going to 15 show you that. 16 Let's go first to slide number one. 17 Here is one of the Crystal Lagoons. One of the 18 things I have talked to this Court about many times when we look at this beautiful picture and you see this multi-acre, 19 20 gigantic --21 THE COURT: I understand the size and I am 22 fascinated by the whole process, but I am interested in the 23 claim. 24 MR. ZEULI: The liner is key. The liner is key, 25 That is the question I wanted to answer.

different between this and a traditional pool? One of the key differences is with a traditional pool you dig a hole and you put thick concrete walls and structure in there.

This does not do that. What they do, and you can kind of see it in this picture, is they grade the soil --

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. ZEULI: -- and then they take a tarp, a plastic material like a tarp and they cover the entire expanse.

THE COURT: People do that in their backyard swimming pools. I understand that.

MR. ZEULI: Here is what they are not able to do. They are able to maybe create that structure, and there were tarps and there were plastic liners that were used in lakes.

Maybe, Bill, you can even bring up the lake picture and show the Judge how murky those are.

What Crystal Lagoons created was additional structure that made that water look like tropical seas, that made that water blue. What was that additional structure?

This all goes to the liner and I am going to bring it all back to the jets.

What we do is when you put the water over the liner, right, the liner has to be able to support the water, but then you have got to have the skimmers and the suction device to clean that liner, because what happens is the

sunlight is coming through the water and it is reflecting 1 2 off of the liner which needs to be clean so that the water looks like that. That is what the lakes that you remember, 3 or maybe on a golf course, didn't have. There might have 4 5 been a black tarp that they laid down or a plastic liner. 6 They weren't either white or blue or clear. 7 THE COURT: Well, you can have a colored plastic 8 liner. 9 MR. ZEULI: Right. 10 THE COURT: Okay. I understand that. 11 MR. ZEULI: Bill, could you go to -- let's start 12 with figure ten of the 514 patent. 13 What they are asking you to do -- again, the claim 14 is not ambiguous. We can talk about their plastic liner and 15 our plastic liner. Our plastic liner has jets. This is figure ten from the 514 patent, and if the Court looks on 16 17 the left, and Bill is pulling it up, you can see that 41 is 18 the water. 39 is the recycling pipe. 40 are the jets. 19 THE COURT: How do you reconcile that with the 20 patent history? Counsel suggests that folks pointed out to the patent office that the infusion of jets would be of some 21 22 difficulty. 23 MR. ZEULI: No, not at all. In fact, that is

25 If we could bring up --

totally taken out of context.

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THE COURT: Well, why don't you tell me what is wrong with that argument of counsel.

MR. ZEULI: I will.

I think you understood how Cant and that patent worked. It had these jets in it, but it was used for the exact opposite purpose. I just got done telling you that in the invention the way that the liner is cleaned is that the sediment and the soot is vacuumed off of that liner. So all of the liner that is exposed needs to be cleaned so the sun can reflect.

Cant had a totally different idea. What Cant did is it took jets on the sides only and blasted water down onto the bottom and it stirred up that water.

In fact, maybe you can bring up figure three of Cant so the Judge can see it.

It stirred up that water and the sediment went up and then it was skimmed off the top. So you got the bottom cleaning invention versus the top cleaning, Cant. The problem is you have got -- the psi of those jets in Cant is 20 psi and there were a lot of them, so it would be like having a bunch of garden hoses on full, firing at --

THE COURT: Where can I find reference to jets in the patent claims?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ ZEULI: No, it is not in the patent claims. It is in --

THE COURT: Are there claims for jets in the patent claims?

MR. ZEULI: In the claims I don't think we have

jets, but the jets can be found at column 9, lines 63 to about 65.

THE COURT: Of what?

MR. ZEULI: Of the 514 patent.

Can I read it to you?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. ZEULI: Maybe Bill can bring this up.

It is column nine of the 514 patent beginning at line 63.

This is describing the picture that we just saw.

The structure has a pipe network with injectors that allow an efficient application of products and water homogenization. That is what it is describing in that picture.

The liner does not need to be -- I don't even know what uniform is, Judge. That is the question for today. Do you need to add that adjective? Not today. That is a factual issue. It is not a claim construction issue. The claim with regard to the plastic liner is very clear. There is nothing that happened in the prosecution history that would say you can't have jets. The vacuums that go along this plastic liner go right over jets and all sorts of other

1 structures. 2 Maybe we could bring up for the Judge -- let's 3 bring up slide 56. Plastic liners are not uniform, not theirs and not 4 5 ours. They are wrinkly. You're talking about almost a mile long tarp. Can you imagine laying down a mile long tarp 6 7 that is not going to have ridges? Again, this is over 8 graded soil. 9 THE COURT: Is there a distinction between the tarp and the liner? 10 11 MR. ZEULI: I am using tarp as a shorthand. 12 plastic liner is what it is called. 13 THE COURT: Are we talking a plastic liner? 14 MR. ZEULI: We are, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: When you say tarp, you're talking 16 about the plastic liner? 17 MR. ZEULI: Correct. I am just using that as an 18 analogy, kind of shorthand. 19 As you can see, the plastic liner that both 20 parties use are not uniform. They know that and they are 21 hoping that by getting you --22 THE COURT: I don't know what you mean by uniform. 23 MR. ZEULI: I don't either. 24 THE COURT: Do you use different kinds of plastic 25 liners?

MR. ZEULI: I don't know. Maybe there are 1 2 different thicknesses, but that is their word. They are 3 asking this Court --THE COURT: No. I'm asking you. Your plastic 4 5 liners, your tarps, in quotation marks, are they the same kind or are they a different kind? 6 7 MR. ZEULI: They are the same. 8 THE COURT: They are the same? 9 MR. ZEULI: Yes. Same liner. 10 So the intrinsic evidence, and if you go back to 11 your statement is there any ambiguity about a plastic liner, 12 no, there is not. Is there any reason to add the adjective 13 uniform? It actually invites ambiguity. 14 Do you need anything more on that? 15 THE COURT: No. 16 MR. ZEULI: Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Do you want to respond at all? 18 MR. BRAITHWAITE: I do, Your Honor, if you will 19 permit me. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the word uniform 22 seems to be the hang-up here, and perhaps the better word 23 and more descriptive is uninterrupted. 24 THE COURT: Say that again. 25 MR. BRAITHWAITE: The word uninterrupted.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Again, talking about the Cant reference and what the patentee said, and what we heard from counsel over here is that, oh, vacuums can go right across these spray jets and these inlets. Well, that is not what the patent says and that is not what the prosecution history says.

Again, what they told the patent office is spray jets and inlets on the bottom interfere with the suction device of the claims. Again, on the slide is an excerpt of what they told the patent office. About halfway down they said whereas the spray jets located in the bottom of the structure disclosed by Cant would also not allow the normal functioning of a bottom cleaning device, e.g., a suctioning device.

Also, the installation of spray jets in the bottom might cause damage to the liner, for example, potentially allowing the formation of cracks that could cause leakage.

What they said is that the liner had to be uninterrupted and that anything on the bottom shooting water up would interfere with the whole purpose of the patent.

Just a little bit of a preview, and I know we are not deciding this today, but in the bottom of the accused structure aren't just garden hoses. They are three-inch pipes, about the size of a fire hose, that are injecting

water into the structure. That is what we're going to be dealing with.

Now, sticking with the patents, since it is all about the patents, so let's look at the patents and what they say. Counsel brought up figure ten and let's start there, and column nine. I think both are good. Counsel stopped just before the context of what the piping network does. At the bottom of column nine starting on line 65, the patent recites the structure has a pipe network with injectors that allow an efficient application of the products and water homogenization, and what they are talking about is potentially the application of chlorine or other water maintenance products, and that allows the water to be homogeneous.

In these large lakes, if the water does not move, then it is going to stagnate. The purpose of this pipe network was just to get the water to move, get things moving and mix things up a little bit. It even says later, you know, if you build this in a windy spot, maybe you don't even need the pipe network because the wind will cause the water to mix and be homogeneous.

The patent goes on, and I am reading from line 65, in swimming pools this is irrelevant. It is saying the injectors of swimming pools that mix the water, that is irrelevant to this patent, just like they said the injectors

at the bottom of a Cant swimming pool, those were irrelevant to what is being claimed. But in large volumes of water, you might have stagnant zones that create contamination centers, and so what the patent describes are these injectors along the sides of the lagoon and that is what counsel showed in figure ten. I will move back to figure ten, because I think it is pretty telling.

Here in figure ten we see the diagram of what was invented and counsel talked about the injectors labeled 40.

Now, those are all along the perimeter. Notice that there are no injectors on the floor, on the bottom because it would interfere with the cleaning of the plastic liner. It would make it so that it couldn't be cleaned as claimed. So this is all just water mixing stuff up on the edges, up above the plastic liner, but not interrupting it, so maybe the better term is uninterrupted. That is what is claimed in the patent and that is what is going to be the issue down the line, is there are injectors all over the place in the accused product such that these claims never should have been --

THE COURT: You suggest or at least the picture suggests a periphery.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Sure. They have got like you might have in a backyard pond, just to keep the water moving so that it does not stagnate, but it is not interrupting

that plastic liner, because it says you would interfere with the whole purpose of the patent and all of the cleaning.

The idea of this patent was to get all of the gunk and the crud on the bottom, and if you have anything interrupting the liner, shoot it back into the water like a fire hose size pipe that is shooting the gunk and crud back into the water, then that is antithetical to this patent. Again, perhaps the better term is this is an uninterrupted liner is what they are claiming and that is what we are asking the Court to construe.

We have looked at what Crystal Lagoons' commercial embodiments are, and I hesitate to do this because the Federal Circuit says it is legal error to look at the commercial embodiment of the patented device in determining infringement or in the claim construction process, but they are not going to show you any inlets or anything else at the bottom of their water structure either. But looking at the commercial embodiment is legal error, and while the presentation may be filled to the brim with looking at what their lagoons look like, that is not the process of claim construction. It is the claims and what is in the patent in black and white and not in pretty pictures and amazing colors, and that is what we are looking at. Again, an uninterrupted liner is what is claimed and that is what we are asking the Court to construe.

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               THE COURT: Why doesn't the patent as a patent say
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     that?
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: It does. It does not use the
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     word uninterrupted.
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               THE COURT: It does not use the word, but it says
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     what it says.
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: It also does not say a liner
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     that can be interrupted with spray jets and liners.
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               THE COURT: No, it says what it says.
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: You're right, Your Honor, and
     that is why this is a context specific exercise in which we
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     look at the claim, but not the claim in isolation.
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     also looking at the rest of the patent and the figures, for
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     example. We're looking at the prosecution history, because
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     those of skill in the art are presumed to have read the
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     whole thing --
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               THE COURT: Well --
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: -- not just the --
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               THE COURT: Isn't the claim in reference to the
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     plastic liner plain and ordinary, suggesting the same thing
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     in your head as his head and my head?
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               MR. BRAITHWAITE: I don't think so. We're all
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     approaching this with different understandings of what it
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     means to be able to claim --
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               THE COURT: Tell me your understanding then if it
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is different than what the claim says. 1 2 MR. BRAITHWAITE: It is not different than what 3 the claim says, but the understanding is that the claim says 4 that the plastic liner needs to be able to be thoroughly 5 cleaned. 6 THE COURT: That is right. That is the function. 7 MR. BRAITHWAITE: And so in our heads if there are 8 inlets and spray jets in the plastic liner, the patent and 9 the prosecution history say it can't be thoroughly cleaned within the meaning of the claim, and so that is what we're 10 thinking, but over here, on the other hand, they are 11 12 thinking that is just fine. Put in as many inlets as you 13 want. You can thoroughly clean everything. You can have a 14 vacuum over it, even though we said that wasn't permitted, 15 but --16 THE COURT: Well, you're talking about different 17 locations too, are you not? 18 MR. BRAITHWAITE: No. Just as in --THE COURT: Jets at the bottom are different than 19 20 jets at the perimeter. 21 MR. BRAITHWAITE: That is true. That is true, but 22 what we're dealing with and, again, the understanding is 23 that our accused structure has jets in the bottom --24 THE COURT: Well, that may be a distinction.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: -- and we are going to address

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understanding is that can't be thoroughly cleaned then, because it is mixing up the water from the bottom, and they said that our patent does not cover that because that is like Cant. We don't do that. That is not what our patent covers, but their actions in this case are different. They have accused this structure that they know has jets in the bottom, so they're under a different impression and their impression is you can thoroughly clean it, jets or no jets, and what we said about Cant in convincing the patent office to give us a patent does not matter and it does.

THE COURT: We're looking at the plain language and not dealing, at this point anyway, with the prosecution history. It says what it says.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: We're dealing with the claim language, but the Phillips case, the seminal case on claim construction from the Federal Circuit says that you look at the claims along with the prosecution history. It is not just the claim in a vacuum in isolation. You look at it with the prosecution history and you look at it with the specifications.

THE COURT: Well, they say no jets at the bottom.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: And if we are all in agreement, great, and let's get rid of this case next month when we address the motion for summary judgment on noninfringement.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel.

MR. ZEULI: Go to slide 54.

Your Honor, we started this conversation with whether the word uniform should be added. That is what the defendants came to this Court and said, Judge, you should add the adjective uniform to plastic liner. I think I showed the Court that uniform is not in the claim language and the Court recognized that. Uniform is never mentioned anywhere in the patent and I think we sort of agreed that uniform is ambiguous. What does that really mean?

Mr. Braithwaite came back up and shifted and he said, well, what it should really mean is uninterrupted.

Well, I don't know why we would inject uninterrupted into a claim that does not use that term. Uninterrupted is not found in the patent.

The process for claim construction is specific.

It is you look at the intrinsic evidence. You start with the claims. Is that word found there? No, it is not. You look at the specification. Is that word found there? No, it is not. You look at the file history. Did the patentee say, oh, we only use an uninterrupted liner? No, they did not. There is no mention of the word uninterrupted whatsoever.

embodiment that's described in the patent. It is wrinkly. The liner is wrinkly. We talked about how it has a recycling system around the sides that has injectors. There is nothing in here that says that it would be uninterrupted or uniform. There is no ambiguity. It is what Mr. Braithwaite said. He said in our heads we are thinking that if we have inlets and drains in the bottom, it can't be thoroughly cleaned. That is an application. That is a fact issue. We'll be talking about that. Is it thoroughly cleaned or isn't it because, as we talked about, you do have to clean the liner that is exposed so that you get that beautiful looking water, but it does not need to be uniform or uninterrupted.

Can we bring up the Cant file history statement?

Mr. Braithwaite really relied heavily on the

statement that the patent owners -- it is the therefore

paragraph, if we could just blow that up for the Court,

Bill. Thank you.

Mr. Braithwaite relied heavily on this paragraph from the file history. His point to you was from this the patent owner unequivocally, because that is what it has to be, disclaimed either a nonuniform liner, the opposite of what they want, or a non-uninterrupted liner, or maybe at the very minimum a liner that does not have jets, but that

is not what it says.

Remember that Cant was the opposite of what Crystal Lagoons does. They take water and they blast it toward the bottom and they get the sediment to rise off the bottom and go to the top and they clean it. Crystal Lagoons uses a vacuum that goes along the bottom. No trouble whatsoever in either one of these products going over those ridges, of going over these little injectors or drains. No problem. The cleaning gets done and that is what we're going to be talking about in a month.

Look at what the applicant said and think about it in the context of the invention has the vacuum working its way across this almost a mile long liner, right? What Cant is talking about is having these water jets coming in from the side. What we're talking about here is how those jets would interrupt the vacuum, right? One, the jets would knock the vacuum of course. The vacuum is coming down the liner and it is cleaning. Why would you shoot jets of water against it? And then the very sediment that the vacuum is to be picking up is no longer there because the jets are sending it up into the air.

Look at what they said. They said the present invention includes a bottom covered with a plastic liner that is able to be thoroughly cleaned, whereas the spray jets located in the bottom of the structure disclosed by

Cant would not allow the normal functioning of the bottom cleaning device. Didn't say uniform. Didn't say non-interrupted. Didn't say it couldn't clean over the little jets and irregularities that pale in comparison to this liner over the ground. It just said it would not allow the normal functioning of the suctioning device, the vacuum, for the two reasons I mentioned. The jets are putting pressure on it and moving it and the sediment is being put back up toward the top where the vacuum is not.

Also, the installation of spray jets at the bottom might cause damage to the liner, for example, potentially allowing the formation of cracks that could cause leakage. The fact of the matter is is that there is leakage in liners all the time. The liners have leakage. That is why we're going to be talking about the pipe refill system. nothing in this statement that talks about the adjectives that they want the Court to add to an otherwise plain meaning.

Yes, we're going to have a discussion in a month about whether it thoroughly cleans. That is a different issue.

> THE COURT: Yes.

You use vacuums?

They both do. MR. ZEULI:

THE COURT: You use a vacuum?

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MR. ZEULI: They both do. Sure. They both use vacuums.

Bring up the vacuum and just show the Judge real quick. I think it is on slide -- I wanted to show you that vacuum. We're going to talk about it a little later. I don't know if I can bring it up real fast. There. Right there.

Look at that. It looks like the Mars lander or the moon rover. I mean that thing can travel over bumps and crevasses. It does not have any trouble cleaning over a drain or a spray nozzle, not at all.

So with regard to claim construction, yes, it would be in error to insert any one of the adjectives that they are suggesting. The language is plain.

THE COURT: Yes. Well, I think that there is no construction necessary. I think we're dealing with a plain and ordinary meaning, frankly.

MR. ZEULI: Yes.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's deal with your third issue.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the next term — there are two terms that are almost identical. They are the freshwater feeding pipe system that allows the entrance of freshwater and results in water removal by displacement of the surface water through the skimmer system.

The other one that is close to it, but stated in not structural but method form, is feeding the water body with inlet water to generate the displacement of surface water, ellipses, and removing displaced surface water using the skimmers.

MR. ZEULI: Your Honor and Mr. Braithwaite, I apologize for the interruption, but we think it would be easier for the Court and preferable if we just stayed with patent by patent and didn't mix the two. So just stay with the structure patent terms and then move --

THE COURT: I understand. It is fine. Let's do it one at a time as best we can, recognizing that we're dealing with interrelated matters over a period of time and integrated one with another.

Go ahead.

MR. ZEULI: That is great, Your Honor, I just --

THE COURT: Talk about freshwater.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Okay, Your Honor.

There is a technology issue here, just to understand what the different types of water flow systems are in swimming pools. I put on the screen a slide that we had in our technology tutorial that we submitted to the Court. Both of these pictures are taken from a little book written by a Mr. Perkins called Swimming Pools. It is the fourth edition of the book printed in 2000. It talks about

different types of pools.

One is a flow through system in which you bring in new water, and it could be water from a lake or a river or something, or if you had enough money it could be municipal water, but you bring it in to the pool and then that causes the ejection of water on the other side. It is called a flow through. It comes in the inlets and it goes out the outlets or the skimmers. So you're continually replacing the water in the structure.

And then the other and, you know, where we live in a desert, and most people are concerned with conserving water, is you have a filtration system where you use the same water over and over again, but you bring it in through the floor drains and through the skimmers, and then you pass it through a filter to clean up the water and put that old water right back into the pool. That is what we're probably most familiar with, that most lay jurors would be familiar with, but these other systems do exist.

What we're talking about in the patent is pretty clearly a flow through system. The asserted claims say it. The specifications say it and the prosecution history says it. It specifically says that the patent is not directed to a filtration system where you take the water from the skimmers and pass it through a filter and put it back into the pool. The specification says that is not the case. The

claim says that that is not the case and the prosecution history of the patents says that that is not the case.

Starting with the words of the claims, we're talking about water removal, so the first place we see removal is about halfway down the claim and it says wherein the structure includes a system of skimmers for the removal of impurities and surface oils. So removal in a vacuum, not in the context of the claims, but just in a vacuum and someone says remove and it could have a number of meanings in different contexts, but here it is talking about getting rid of and disposing, eliminating the impurities and surface oils. You don't want to recirculate impurities and surface oils because that would be antithetical to keeping a clean and clear pool, so they remove impurities and surface oils.

THE COURT: Where do the surface oils come from?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Mainly from our bodies. If you had a pool and no one jumped in it, it stays pretty clean.

But humans are dirty, and when we put on sunscreen and just the natural oils of our skin and we get in the pool they come off and they don't sink to the bottom. The floor drain is not going to suck them up.

So if you were to block off the skimmers of your pool you could see this sheen, you know, you get those oily, rainbow slicks on the top of your pool. The skimmers take off that top layer and in our normal pools they send it to

the filter and get rid of those oils, and then once it is oil free water, you put it back in the pool.

Here what is claimed is a freshwater feeding pipe system that allows the entrance of freshwater and results in water removal by displacement of the surface water through the skimmer system. We're not talking about recirculated water. We're talking about removing it. It is a pass-through system.

So we have got these multiple instances of the word removal and we should understand them the same. It is the same word and we interpret it consistently and it is talking about injection and disposal, not recirculation.

We have cited the cases and the principles of claim construction, that the same words are interpreted consistently and different words are presumed to have different meanings. So if we look at the unasserted claims, they are very instructive.

When Crystal Lagoons brought this case, they only asserted certain of the numbered claims in the patents and chose not to assert others. If we look at claim five, and this is one that is not asserted, and this says take all of those limitations of claim one and add to it a recycling system that uses pipes with injectors which allow maintaining water homogeneity by avoiding stagnating zones and allowing the application of chemicals.

These are the side injectors that we looked at in figure ten that mix up the water and keep it from stagnating. It is not a filter. We're going to see that. They are not talking about a filtration system. They knew how to say the word recycling when they wanted to, but they used in claim one the word remove the water. Don't recycle it. Recycle and removed are presumed to have different meanings and we know they know how to say the word recycle.

Then in claim eight, and this is like claim one, and it is kind of like claim one and claim five together actually. Here you have the system of skimmers. I'm about halfway down. It says a system of skimmers disposed along the border for the removal of impurities and surface oils, semicolon, and then next it says a recycling piping system installed around the border of the structure and including a plurality of water injectors distributed along the border for injecting water into the water body to maintain homogeneity. That is what we just saw in connection with claim five.

Then we have the same limitation from claim one, a freshwater feeding pipe system that allows the entrance of freshwater and results in water removal by displacement of surface water through the skimmer system. If water removal meant the same thing as recycling it, then that means that the recycling element is vitiated and it has no meaning at

all. So these mean different things. That is what we're talking about is water removal.

Now let's move to the specification. What does the patent specification and description say? Well, this comes from column ten, lines 32 through 36. It says that the crystalline structures or ponds must have water intakes that allow using low cost water, since in contrast to swimming pools that recycle water through filters, in this case the water from the skimmers and suction cart or device is disposed of.

If you have really expensive water, this system is not going to work, or at least it is not going to be cost effective. It depends on how much money you have, I suppose. It says that you need to be using low cost water, because you're going to be getting rid of it. The claims claim a structure where the water is completely disposed of. It is that pass through system.

Then in column nine, 43 through 53, the specification says the structure must have skimmers to remove surface oils and particles, since otherwise they accumulate and deter water quality, even after performing all of the chemical treatment steps, since these do not remove floating greases or solids. In this way the final objective of obtaining color transparency and cleanliness characteristics similar to swimming pools or tropical seas

at low cost would not be fulfilled without these skimmers.

The process of moving superficial water toward the skimmers caused by freshwater entry together with a flocculant suction device system replaces the traditional filtering system of swimming pools.

Again, we are not talking about recycling through a traditional filtration system. We are talking about getting rid of that water. Think of how it is built. If it is built without a filter, and if the skimmers just took the water out and put it back in, there is nothing to get rid of the oil because there is no filter. So they are ejecting the water and that is the structure that is being described and the process that would also be described in the process patent.

In the file history of one of the family members, and the Federal Circuit says that you can even look at different patents in the same family to figure out how one of skill in the art would understand these terms. The patent applicant said the structure also has systems to harvest and constantly supply freshwater with certain quality needed for the maintenance of the water at low cost. This is also not a requirement of standard pools that filter and recirculate water, because they do not need a constant supply of freshwater with certain physiochemical parameters. Again, we are not talking about filtering water. Our

skimmers don't go through a filter. They dump and inject the water.

I'm going to bring up Cant again because it actually came up in this context as well. The patent examiner said, hey, look at Cant. It has got skimmers and we're going to reject your claims. The patent applicant said no, no, no. Cant is different.

Let's look at Cant real quick. I put it again on the screen. The important point here -- the filter is identified as item 54 over there on the left. That is a filter. The skimmer is up there at 56. The water flows through that skimmer and comes down and moves along the bottom pipe and gets reinjected into the pool.

Here is what the patent applicant said during prosecution. In response to the examiner saying, hey, Cant discloses skimmers, the patent applicant said specifically Cant in its entirety is silent with respect to the freshwater feeding pipe system of claim one.

In contrast, Cant merely describes a filtration system in which pool water is forced through one or more filters, filter 54 or filter 72, to remove debris from the pool water. The filtration system of Cant neither discloses nor suggests, quote, a freshwater feeding pipe system that allows the entrance of freshwater and results in water removal by displacement of surface water through the skimmer

system.

So this picture of the skimmers going through a filter is entirely silent with respect to water removal, but that is not what they're claiming here and that is why we need claim construction is to say if water removal means what it says, removing, then we are good, but if the interpretation is recycling, then that is a whole other thing and the patent specifically disclaims that and the prosecution history disclaims that and that is not found in the claims of the patent either.

The other filter here I will just note, was described as numeral 72, and that is kind of on the bottom, and what is happening is there is a floor drain there at 62 that is pulling in water from the floor and passing it through the filter and then it is coming out of those inlets on the bottom, 47.

There was a little bit of a misstatement before I think about Cant and the vacuums and everything. What Cant shows there on the side, the inlets right at the bottom, on the wall but at the bottom, and they are pushing water in so that the water gets mixed up. Well, that is the interruption of the plastic liner. That whole system of bringing water in at that low level interferes with the cleaning as well and that is, again, what we're dealing with in this case.

A preview down the line here and what the Court is going to see is what is highlighted here on the left, these wall injectors on the side, just like in Cant, interrupting the concrete on the wall, because the wall is not actually covered in a plastic liner, but interrupting the whole thing so it mixes up the water and does not allow things to be thoroughly clean. At every instance this patent says not like a pool, not like filters and not like anything else, and we are bringing in water and what that is doing is causing the dumpage of the extra water, displacement.

What we have in the brief, and I don't know if it is still an issue, is what does displacement mean? Is that an equivalent amount or is it something lesser? I guess this is the construction of another word, but I think displace literally means to take the place of, and so it is like anything else that if you put a gallon of water in, then you are displacing a gallon of water and a gallon of water gets dumped through those skimmers. That is what we're asking the Court to construe that removal means removal, not non-removal or recycling.

THE COURT: You say that is what the claim says?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. You agree with that?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I completely agree that removal

25 means removal.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ZEULI: Let me just clarify something for the Court before I launch into why removal is a different word than elimination. I think I just heard counsel say removal means removal. That is the claim term that is in dispute here and I don't think we need to have construction.

Removal is the word in the claim. The briefing was that the defendant wanted to change the word removal to the word elimination, but unless I'm misunderstanding, Judge, I think he just agreed that they agree that the claim does not need to be construed because removal is the word that was in dispute. Sure we can have a discussion in a month about what gets removed and how much gets removed out of the accused structure, but I think for claim construction, if I heard it right, I don't think there is any construction needed here.

THE COURT: I don't think so either.

MR. ZEULI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Your next one?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the next one is pumping system, but it really goes hand in hand with the suction device. They are not really evaluated in isolation and should be brought together.

Is that okay with the Court if I address both, pumping system and suction device?

THE COURT: Yes. You go ahead.

MR. ZEULI: Your Honor, if I could just interrupt again. We are okay with that as long as we stay on the 514, the structure patent, and we are not getting into the other two patents yet.

THE COURT: Okay. You go ahead.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: All right. Let's start with movable suction device. It is kind of a generic term and it does not say vacuum, but the alternative construction proposed by Crystal Lagoons is just an ordinary run-of-the-mill pool vacuum. That is not what these patents describe in the claims and it is not what they describe in the specification and it is not what is described in the prosecution history. Again, the entire context of the patent is that this is not talking about pool vacuums.

Instead, it is talking about a suction device that operates as a complete replacement for a filtration system. The patentee gave special definition to the term suction device and specifically contrasted it with a vacuum. At column nine, lines 1 through 16, the patentee said this. They are essentially giving the definition of a suction device.

It is important to keep in mind that the objective of the suction device is not only the cleaning of the bottom of the described process, as is the case of vacuum devices

of traditional pools, but that said suction device replaces completely the traditional filtering system of swimming pools together with the use of flocculants.

Furthermore, the fact that the process contemplates the displacement and removal of superficial water with impurities towards the structure slots complements the action of the suction device. In other words, the suction device not only removes material naturally deposited on the bottom, leaves, branches, earth, et cetera, but also the suspended particles that are eliminated by filtration in the case of swimming pools and are converted into floccules or large particles and are suctioned by the device in this invention, thus decreasing their removal cost by an order of magnitude.

That idea that this was a complete replacement for traditional filtration was so important that they restated the whole thing twice. Again, at column 12, 3 through 9, the patent applicant says the identical thing. It is important to keep in mind that the objective of the suction device or suction cart is not only the cleaning of the bottom in the described process, as is the case of a vacuum in swimming pools, but that the suction device replaces completely the traditional filtering system of swimming pools together with the use of flocculants and the skimmer system. So where, as here, the patentee has clearly defined

a claim term, that definition is usually dispositive. That comes from the Jack Guttman case we cited in the briefs.

But, more importantly, this is an instance in which these claims don't say the words traditional filtration, but they do through the term suction device, because suction device as defined is a complete replacement of traditional filtration.

This is where the Virnetx case from the Federal Circuit comes into play. In that case the literal language of the claims was to a secure communication link. It just used the word secure. It didn't say anything about anonymity. What the patentee was saying is our claims don't require anonymity. That word does not appear in the claims. The defendant was saying, yeah, but your whole patent is directed to anonymity in connection with security. The entire purpose of the whole thing is anonymity.

So the Federal Circuit said secure, that term secure as used in that asserted patent, means both data security and anonymity. It incorporates that concept, because it was so front and center of the patent under examination, and so the court construed secure to require both data security and anonymity.

It said the fact that the summary of the invention gives primacy to both these attributes strongly indicates that the invention requires more than just simple data

security. That is on page 1318 of that Virnetx case.

THE COURT: What is your point?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, the point here is that, again, the interpretation of suction device can't just mean the mere pool vacuum. One of skill in the art wouldn't think, oh, that is an everyday pool vacuum when reading these claims. What they would understand, based on the entire context, is that suction device means that that is the way the claim structure is cleaned. It is not cleaned through filtration, because the suction device completely replaces a filtration system. That is what the patent applicant said over and over again ad nauseam in the specifications of the prosecution history.

THE COURT: So what?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, it matters because what Cloward H20 designed was a traditionally filtered pool.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: They designed a traditionally filtered pool. They have a whole host of skimmers and inlets and outlets that send water to huge filters, two big filter houses on the side of this lagoon that is accused by Cloward H2O, and they filter the entire volume of this two-acre lagoon twice each day. They don't rely on simple pool vacuums as a replacement for filtration.

So the suction device that is claimed is not just

the little robotic pool vacuum, everyday pool vacuums that 1 2 have been in use for 30 some odd years. That can't possibly 3 be the suction device, because what the patent claimed was a suction device that completely replaces traditional 4 5 filtration. 6 THE COURT: That is fine. It says what it says. 7 MR. BRAITHWAITE: It does, but Crystal Lagoons is 8 going to come up here and --9 THE COURT: Well, let's wait and let them assert 10 whatever they assert. 11 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Let's see what they assert. THE COURT: Okay. 12 13 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: I might indicate here that when we 15 break today, we'll break at a quarter to 12:00 and we'll 16 reassemble about 1:30. 17 MR. ZEULI: That should work perfectly, Your 18 Honor, because we're on the last two terms of the 514 structural patent, which Mr. Braithwaite has covered 19 20 together and I will do the same as well. 21 What I was going to say is it is so fascinating --22 it is so fascinating, and I think that is why I love the job 23 that I have because I get to talk to people like you about 24 language, and I just remember going back to the hearing, and

I don't know when we had it but, you know, you said

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something about, you know, is there ambiguity in this document? We'll look at the entire document. The entire document that we're talking about is the 514 patent and it is the structure.

I talked at the beginning about how important it was that this invention was a liner over soil, not a concrete traditional pool, and then you had to have three structural elements that allowed that liner over soil to provide that crystal clear water, and they were the skimmer system, the pumping system and the vacuum. We're going to talk about the pumping system and the vacuum.

Let's look at what the claim language says, because there is really no ambiguity in the words. I think Your Honor keeps saying that they say what they mean and I think that is exactly right.

Thank you, Bill. Actually, Bill, could you bring up claim one?

Let's look at it together. Here are the terms that we're talking about now. We're talking about these last lines at the end, a pumping system, including a coupling means connected to a removable suction device for cleaning the plastic liner.

I mean where is the ambiguity? Do we not think a jury will be able to assess our evidence as to their pumping system and their vacuum? I already showed you their vacuum.

It is that cool moon lander thing. I think it is pretty cool and the jury is going to look at that and they are going to say it is a suction device.

Bill, go back to the presentation.

What they are suggesting is they want you to add 49 new words. We are not talking about something super technical that a layperson or a lay judge has never encountered. This is not a X.M.L. load file from who knows what. It is a pump. We have them all over our houses. It is a vacuum. We have them. They want to add 49 new words to have the Court say things such as, and let me use my cursor here if I can, that it is going to remove not only the settled debris, and that is the soot on the bottom of the liner, right, and you have to remove that and we agree with that.

Suspended solids? No, that is not what the vacuum pumping system removes. Those would be suspended. It is suction. It sucks things off the bottom. So even the 49 words that they have come up with is wrong. It would defeat the very invention that this gentleman created and now has over 70 working lagoons around the world.

One of the things that Mr. Braithwaite said is water is expensive. Water is expensive. They have a 100-acre lagoon in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. Where there was desert, there is a 100-acre Crystal Lagoons because this

technology works and it is water efficient. It is very water efficient. All you have to do is keep the liner clean so when the sun comes in the water looks good. Why do we need 49 words to be added to this? It makes no sense at all. Those words are not found in the claims. They are not found.

The reference in the patent that Mr. Braithwaite talked about, yes, it mentions one embodiment where the water is disposed of, but that is not the only thing it mentions. I will show the Court where it talks about recycling far more times. I believe the disposal of the water and the quote Mr. Braithwaite showed you, and I will bring it up, they use that once and then right below it they talk about recycling the water, because if you have got 100 acres in the Egyptian desert you are not throwing out the water. There is no way. It makes no sense. The invention wouldn't even work. You remember the skimmers I talked about and that struck and you have to have that. If you throw out the water, that water level would go below those skimmers and it wouldn't go anywhere. It wouldn't even work. Why would you do this?

Here is what it would look like. This sort of points out the error here of the defendant's proposal. They would take from claim one, pumping system, and if Your Honor looks on the screen, and look how it would look with 49

different words in there. Does that make any sense? I don't think so.

It also introduces a step. I keep mentioning to the Court let's keep these patents separate because they are separate. One covers the structure for holding the water and the structure that keeps it looking the way Crystal Lagoons looks. The other two we're going to talk about after lunch, they go to the process for doing that and they are separate. You could have the structure and you could use different processes for cleaning that water and for treating that water and you might use what they invented and you might use something different, but that does not have anything to do with the structure. The structure is the structure. It has a pump and a vacuum. It is not that hard.

When we talk about the methods, they could be used with different things too. They don't have to be used with that structure. They are separate and independent. Here they are trying to mix the two, because it talks about removing the water. That is not what it requires.

I want to go to the vacuum for a moment.

Can we get to the removal suction device? I will talk about that briefly.

This goes back, you know, and this is sort of treaded ground, and you may recall that you ruled -- you

denied their earlier summary judgment and this was this issue. They came before the Court and they wanted in this patent, the 514 patent, they wanted you to insert all of those words. We did this already. The Court said no, I'm not going to do that. That is process. There is nothing in the claims that requires that the disposal of the water not be with tradition filtration, nothing at all.

Bill, could you bring up column 10, please. First I want to go to lines 32 to 36.

I think the Court is familiar with that there can be different embodiments in a patent. Now, this is the language that Mr. Braithwaite talked about and basically this is what they are hanging their hat on. They are saying that here in the patent the inventor said, you know, we dispose of the water. Sure. Sometimes they do, but not always.

Let's leave this, Bill, and if you can maybe up in the top, let's blow up for the Judge lines 56 through 61.

Could you just highlight recycling system?

In that same paragraph, in that very same paragraph of the patent the inventor, Mr. Fishman, is describing that there is structure that recycles, and we have talked about that earlier and we saw that in figure 10, the recycling system. Sure, sometimes you might dispose of the water, but you don't always have to.

If you think about it, why would you? Water is expensive. It makes no sense that you would have this enormous, multi-acre piece of structure and you would dump the water out. The claim makes no requirement for that. It just requires a pump and a suction device to clean the plastic liner. That is all. They have a pump and a suction device and so do we. We'll talk about those next month but, you know, when you go back to the claim construction, what is the context where somehow we should inject 49 new words for a pump and a vacuum. It just makes no sense. It just makes no sense at all. It is not found in the claims. The patent office didn't require it. In the specification itself, yes, sometimes they do dispose of the water but not always.

They also talk about recycling. In fact, disposal of water is only mentioned one time in the patent, Your Honor, one time, and Mr. Braithwaite found it. Of course it is in there and that is one option. Seven times it mentions recycling, because if you think about it, you're not throwing out the water. It just does not make any sense and there is nothing in this claim that would cause it to be ambiguous, and that would require you to put in 49 different words, 49 new words.

Essentially, again, this is where the Court ruled last time when we were here at summary judgment the first

time. They wanted you to add these words and the Court correctly said that that is a process step and it is not structure and we're talking about structure, and there isn't anything in the claim or the patent or file history that says that you have got to use this -- and what do they say here -- the disposal of water with mixed debris. We have already covered this ground and you rejected it then and I would suggest it should be rejected now.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Any response, counsel?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes, please.

Your Honor, we are not injecting words into the claim and the argument that this is just an exercise to inject words is not really an argument. We're trying to figure out what is claimed. What is the scope of what the patentee invented? There are a couple of issues here, and on the one hand Crystal Lagoons has marched into this court saying it is just so simple. We just have some plastic liner and a skimmer and a vacuum and that's what our patent covers.

Well, that is every pool ever. That is the problem with this case. They have come into this court saying we have a patent on a swimming pool. Cloward and his company have been building swimming pools plus enormous recreational water features since the nineties with plastic

liners, skimmers and injectors.

That is not what they claimed. When we get down into the claim, it is a claim to a swimming pool. It is a claim to their particular process. It is not just a simple vacuum. It is not a traditional pool filtration system and it is not just simple skimmers that recycle the water, because they said it wasn't that.

One of the words in which they encapsulated this whole idea that this is not a traditional swimming pool and it is not traditional cleaning methods is the word suction device. Counsel got up here and said suction device does not clean suspended particles. Well, tell the author of the patent that, because that is exactly what the patent says.

Where?

We read previously from the section paragraph and it explicitly states that that is the very purpose of the suction device is to clean up suspended particles. It says, in other words, the suction device not only removes material naturally deposited on the bottom, leaves, branches, earth, et cetera, but also the suspended particles that are eliminated by filtration in the case of swimming pools, and that are converted into floccules and suctioned by the device in this invention, the one of the 514 patent.

With respect to what happens with the water of the suction device, well, if they don't have a filter and they

are not filtering the water and they are not relying on filtering, then they have got to dispose of it, because there is nothing to get the suspended particles out.

So what is described in the patent is the elimination of the water. They use the word remove in the claims and that is what they do. They remove it. They don't recycle it. It says the crystalline structures or ponds must have, not may have, not in some embodiments have, must always have water intakes that allow using low cost water, since in contrast to swimming pools that recycle through the filters, in this case the water from the skimmer and the suction cart or device is disposed of. In this case and in this patent what we're talking about in the claims of the 514, it is disposed of and that is what the patent says.

Now, the argument is to move beyond the patent, to go to Egypt, and there is nothing said about Egypt in this patent. They do talk about something in Chile. In Chile the embodiment pulls water from the ocean and brings it into the lagoon and they clean it up and then it is ejected back out to the ocean through the skimmers. It passes through.

Now, in Egypt maybe water is in short supply and they can't do that. Well, that just means that Egypt is not covered by this patent. That is why the Federal Circuit has said it is error for a court to compare in its infringement analysis the accused product or process with the patentee's

commercial embodiment. That comes from the Zenith Labs,
Inc. case versus Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 19 F3d 1418, pincite
1423. It is a 1994 case.

But even in this last year, 2020, the Federal Circuit said in Myco Industries, Inc. vs. Blephex,
B-1-e-p-h-e-x, at 995 F3d 1, pincite 15, and this is in
2020, the law is clear, however, that, quote, infringement is determined on the basis of the claims, not on the basis of comparison with the patentee's commercial embodiment of the claimed invention. Similarly, claim construction from which an infringement analysis depends focuses on the recited limitations, not the features of the commercial embodiment.

THE COURT: What difference does it make if they use a process for recycling the water after the claim process has been used to dispose of the water? Think about that.

I'm going to break right now because of another commitment. 1:30 and we'll keep going.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll be in recess.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

It looks like we're all here. We had fun during the noon hour. There was a ceremonial occasion that

occurred naming this courthouse for Senator Orrin Hatch, which was conducted very nicely, and most of us attended by Zoom, but it was worth attending.

At any rate, I have looked at the matters we were discussing prelunch and I am of the opinion that there is no need for construction of the provisions that we were talking about. I think they are clear and they are simple enough and they are understandable.

Let's move on to the next one.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, if you will permit me, you asked me a question right before we broke, and I think it was along the lines of so what and why are we talking about this traditional filtration thing and I have a response.

THE COURT: I'm happy to have you respond.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: It has to do with how justice is achieved in the patent system and with a patent case. What we had here and the background of this case is Crystal Lagoons bid a project down at the Hard Rock Casino in Florida. They put forth their proposal about how to build a lagoon with the flocculation and their suction device and everything they talked about in their patent. The property owner didn't want to go along with that so they reached out to Cloward at Cloward H2O and said can you do this. Cloward said I can do it like a swimming pool. I can put in a

filtration system so that it is a filtered thing. I don't want to do nor am I going to do what Crystal Lagoons does. So Crystal Lagoons lost the project and Cloward was the designer on the project.

I think this case bubbles out of that, one company selected over the other. What we had in the initial complaint -- this is almost two years ago -- paragraph 67 from that complaint says on information and belief the Hard Rock lagoon was previously designed as a conventional swimming pool with a swimming pool filtration system and a large number of inlets and outlets to filter the entire volume of water and, therefore, would not infringe Crystal Lagoons' patents.

However, from what has been observed at the site, there would not be a traditional filtration system, since there is a small number of inlets and outlets that would not allow filtering the entire volume of water, as well as not having the proper amount of filtration for this purpose.

The small number, and those are kind of vague terms in and of themselves, but what Crystal Lagoons was referring to is shown in 71. They talk about initial drawings. Again, when it is like a conventional swimming pool, it had 80 inlets located on the lagoon's bottom and walls, which are not present in the currently built lagoon at the Hard Rock Hollywood project.

This initially brought to mind, hey, you guys are There are two big filter houses that filter this entire thing more than twice a day. There are over 100 inlets and outlets in this system, way more than the 80 you thought was sufficient. So we brought an early summary judgment motion because of their admission. Their patents are not directed to this traditional filtration. That was the earlier summary judgment motion in this case. provided prediscovery our construction plans for the lagoon showing the hundreds of inlets. It is not like these are hidden. You can go down to Florida and put your foot in the water and touch them and figure out where the inlets are and you can count them up. If you did your pre-suit investigation, you should have counted up 130 some inlets, but it didn't happen.

What we got during that hearing was a request to this Court to kick the can down the road to claim construction. In the transcript of that hearing Mr. Zeuli says they are trying to confuse the Court early before there is discovery that a patent related to the structures of these lagoons has something to do with filtration. It doesn't. If they want to make that argument when we are doing claim construction, we can have a fully briefed, you know, issue on why that is not the case, but it shouldn't come this way raised for the first time in their reply

brief.

It was let's kick that issue down the road until today. So here we are at claim construction when Mr. Zeuli said the time would be appropriate, and now the request again let's kick the can down the road.

THE COURT: Well, it may be appropriate to kick it down the road in reference to the existence and operation of a filtration system. It is either an auxiliary system or a concurrent system or an afterthought system, but we're concerned with the patent claims.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Exactly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The patent claims.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I am not here asking the Court today to determine whether or not the Hard Rock lagoon has a filtration system or not. That is for another day. We don't think there is any dispute because there is a massive filter house and anyone with eyes can see it, but not for today.

The question today is what is the scope of these claims? Do they cover structures with the traditional filtration system? The claims say they don't. The specification -- we put up on the screen all of the places where they say our system of skimmers that eject water, and our system with the suction device replaces the traditional filtration system, so inherent in these claims is we are not

talking about traditional filtration.

So we're asking the Court what is the scope of the claims? Does the scope cover traditionally filtered pools?

We can have the question later about whether the Hard Rock meets that.

THE COURT: They have disclaimed any interest, as far as I can determine, in the so-called traditional swimming pool filtration system, but we're dealing with a question of what activity is permissible activity after the so-called contaminated water is extracted from the pond, the lake, whatever you want to call it, and the manner in which that is subsequently used. That is not involved in this lawsuit.

As far as I can determine, nobody has asserted at this point that they claim an interest. They disclaim an interest as far as their system is concerned in the traditional swimming pool filtration system. They say, look, flocculants, freshwater, disposal, displace, and if there is some proficient or some suggestion that they are indeed using a traditional filter system, then one would have to ask to what extent does that in some fashion assist in our determination as to the scope of the claims?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: But, Your Honor, it is the scope of the claims that says that the system, the claimed system, the affirmatively claimed system has a suction device which

completely replaces --

THE COURT: It says what it says.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Right.

THE COURT: It has a device and that is what it says.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: But the device and the meaning of that suction device is the complete replacement of a traditional replacement system, and where we have a difference of --

what it says and does what you claim it does and is involved as far as the limits go, the fact that they may have an adjacent system of some kind is an interesting question. It is an interesting question. They do or they don't, and that may have some bearing on the outcome of what we're dealing with.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: But what we are not addressing today is what they do. That is what the Federal Circuit --

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. We are doing what is known as the impossible. We are dealing with matters as hypotheticals almost, which is a rather strange way of thinking about a problem, but at this point the question becomes is the language the kind of language that in some fashion requires, because of ambiguity or vagueness or lack of specificity, some kind of a rational

construction. I think it says what it says. I don't think 1 2 it requires construction at this point. 3 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, if I might refer to the 02 Micro International case from the Federal Circuit in 4 5 2008, they dealt with this problem that we have here. They 6 said a determination that a claim term, quote, needs no 7 construction, end quote, or has the, quote, plain and 8 ordinary meaning, end quote, may be inadequate when a term 9 has more than one ordinary meaning. 10 THE COURT: Well, that is right. It is an 11 ambiguous term and you have got to tell me what the 12 ambiguity is and you have yet to do that. 13 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the ambiguity is 14 each party is saying that these terms are ambiguous. 15 THE COURT: No, they don't. 16 MR. BRAITHWAITE: They are coming at the terms 17 with different interpretations and different understandings. 18 THE COURT: No. It says what it says. You tell me your view of why it is ambiguous. 19 That is the whole process. 20 21 MR. BRAITHWAITE: The ambiguity seems to be coming 22 because what these claims state is they don't cover a 23 traditionally filtered body of water. 24 THE COURT: Do they? 25 MR. BRAITHWAITE: No, they don't.

THE COURT: Then what are we talking about? 1 2 MR. BRAITHWAITE: What we have here is a lawsuit 3 that is premised on these claims actually covering a traditionally filtered body of water. 4 5 THE COURT: How do we know that? 6 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Because Crystal Lagoons brought 7 the lawsuit. THE COURT: So what? 8 9 They are saying, hey, our system is this. You're suggesting that they have got an auxillary system, a 10 11 tagalong system as I understand your argument. 12 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Okay. I think I understand now, 13 Your Honor. I am sorry. 14 So the system down at the Hard Rock lagoon does 15 not do what they claim and what the patent describes. 16 THE COURT: It may not. That is their proof 17 problem. 18 MR. BRAITHWAITE: That is and that is what we'll 19 be addressing in October, but this is a predicate to that 20 question. Down at the Hard Rock lagoon it is not an 21 auxillary system. It is the whole system. 22 THE COURT: Well, it may well be. If it is the 23 whole system, they have got problems. 24 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. That may 25 have just answered my question.

The only point I guess to answer your question so 1 2 why does it matter is that the case has gone on for almost 3 two years, and while the Patent Act allows a patent defendant that has been unreasonably accused of patent 4 5 infringement such as Cloward H20 to collect their attorneys' 6 fees and everything else at the end of the day, the end of 7 the day has to come sometime. And the persistent request to 8 kick it down the --9 THE COURT: That is right. As soon as we pretry this matter, we'll set it for trial. 10 11 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Okay. I will move on, Your 12 Honor. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: I'm sure that you and I and others 14 have been concerned with the virus and that the virus has 15 been an interplaying partner in everything that we do. 16 You're one of the few times I have had people show 17 up in court. I do that deliberately because of the nature 18 of the case. 19 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 appreciate that and thank you for indulging me for a moment. It is a pleasure to be back here in this courtroom with you. 21 22 Moving on to the next term, portion of water, this 23 implicates an entirely different patent and patent family. 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 MR. BRAITHWAITE: So the 514 patent and the 822

patent are part of the same family that was filed back in the year 2006. This 520 patent from which the phrase portion of water comes is something entirely separate. It was based on an application filed in 2012, so some six odd years later. I have put a portion of claim one up here on the screen that uses this phrase a portion of water. It talks about the portion of water — that someone needs to go and identify a portion of water intended for recreational purposes within the water body.

Now, I think the ambiguity --

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MR. ZEULI: Mr. Braithwaite, I apologize for interrupting and, Judge, I apologize for interrupting. Our position is that portion of water does not need to be construed. However, if the Court wanted to construe it, we don't have an objection to the defendant's portion of the entire water body, so we could move on to the other claim. Portion of water does not need construction, but for the sake of moving this along --

THE COURT: Are we talking a cup?

MR. ZEULI: What is that?

THE COURT: Are we talking a cup? What kind of a portion are you talking about?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I though it was all recreation.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I completely agree. The vagary

that we're trying to resolve is what we understand portion 1 2 to mean as a part, not the whole thing, and what we 3 understand Cloward's interpretation of portion is is the whole thing. 4 5 THE COURT: Well, no. He just indicated that he agreed with you. 6 7 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Then I think we are fine. 8 THE COURT: Okay. No need to worry about it. 9 Ultimately somebody is going to have to define it for the Court on a factual basis in contrast to a claim 10 11 basis. 12 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: I am interested in the term recreation 14 as well. People seem to focus in on swimming. Are we 15 talking kayaks or are we talking surfboards? What are we 16 talking about? Somebody is going to have to say the whole 17 thing is a recreational activity. Then we get into the 18 interesting question as to which portion do you measure 19 chemically and what portion do you measure for temperature? 20 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Correct, Your Honor. 21 Recreation has not been one of our terms, but I 22 think the patent describes recreation as everything from 23 swimming to kayaking to all sorts of recreation. 24 THE COURT: Walking on water. 25 MR. BRAITHWAITE: That, too, I suppose.

I am not sure we have a construction issue on that, but there is going to be a dispute, a factual dispute about -- I think Crystal Lagoons focuses on swimming not being allowed in certain portions. You know, I think it raises an interesting question with respect to the next term which is delimiting zone. I don't know if Your Honor has been up to the Jewish Community Center up by the University of Utah, but this is a picture of a pool where I take --THE COURT: I had been there before it was ever

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the community center as a matter of fact.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: This is a portion of their pool.

THE COURT: Prior to the time that Izzy Wagner bought it and dedicated it.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, it is still in active use today and this is where my daughter swims.

There are portions of this pool that are dedicated to different recreational purposes. There is this broad, sweeping, zero entry zone where kids can splash around and play without having to worry about the deep end. There is the shallow end of the pool where swimmers can generally swim and then there are the diving boards.

One time my daughter went to cross the buoy line and go towards the diving boards and the lifequard was no, no, no. You don't swim. People are going to jump on your There is no swimming under the diving boards, but it is still a recreative end of the pool. That is kind of what we're dealing with here. We have swimming zones and kayaking zones and everything else.

One of the terms here is delimiting zone, because what the 520 patent talks about is a portion of water that is treated to sanitary compliance and that portion of water has three different zones in it. It describes them using these terms sanitary compliant zone, delimiting zone, and most and favorable zone. They are all part of the portion.

So what I have put on the screen is kind of a description of that and what is described. You have the sanitary compliant zone, which might be roped off and it might not be roped off. It does not really matter.

Then you have the delimiting zone, which is the edge, and then there is the rest of the lake out there.

Then there is this idea of the most and favorable zone.

What is being described is these chemical dispensers at three, the little triangles, spitting out chlorine or some other chemical cleaner, and so it cleans this portion of water. At this furthest point, the edge of your sanitary compliant zone, that is where your water quality is probably going to be the worst because it is the furthest from your chemical dispenser.

So the question that is inherent in the delimited zone is delimited from what? Both parties agree on the

general construction that a delimiting zone is a virtual zone that delimits the sanitary compliant zone and does not require a physical barrier, but the construction has inherent in it what Cloward has proposed for construction, that it is delimitating it from the non-sanitary compliant zone, the rest of the water, the place that is not treated. That is what the dispute centers around.

We continue on with the vagary of delimiting zone with the unanswered question, delimited from what, if we just go along with Crystal Lagoons' construction. That is why we have proposed the additional language to describe what is delimited, which is inherent in the term, and it is the rest, the non-sanitary compliance area. There is not much more to say about it than that, because that is the entire purpose of the 520 patent.

With that I will turn my time to Mr. Zeuli.

MR. ZEULI: Bill, could you go to slide 93,

Sometimes claim construction is hard and you have to look at all of the intrinsic evidence and sometimes extrinsic evidence if there is ambiguity, but only if there is ambiguity. The one time claim construction is not hard is when the inventor acts as his own lexicographer, a fancy word for providing a definition in the patent.

THE COURT: You have done that with one of your

please.

terms, if I remember correctly. 1 2 MR. ZEULI: That is correct. That is the one that 3 we are on, the delimiting zone. It is the only one that the defendants have asked this Court to construe where the 4 5 inventor --6 THE COURT: Tell me again how you define it. 7 MR. ZEULI: I will read it right out of the 8 patent. As used herein, the delimiting zone corresponds to 9 a virtual zone --10 THE COURT: A zone is a zone. MR. ZEULI: -- that delimits the sanitary 11 12 compliant zone and does not require a physical barrier. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Tell me what you really do. 14 MR. ZEULI: Sure. I will talk about that, but I 15 do want to mention one other thing before I leave this. 16 When there is a definition provided by the 17 inventor that --18 THE COURT: You're stuck with it. MR. ZEULI: That is right. For better or for 19 20 worse you're stuck with it. Here the defendant has come to 21 say, look, you should reject the definition that the 22 inventor wrote in his patent, and ignore the law on being 23 his own lexicographer, and add that there is delimitation 24 between this chemically treated area and a non-treated area.

There is no non-treated area. Lagoons are treated.

25

talk someday about recreational --1 2 THE COURT: The whole thing? 3 MR. ZEULI: The whole thing. THE COURT: The whole thing is chemically treated? 4 5 MR. ZEULI: That is correct. The whole thing is 6 chemically treated. 7 Can you bring up figures one and two? 8 What Mr. Fishman came up with, though, is when 9 you're chemically treating a swimming pool in your backyard, 10 it does not require all that much chemistry. It is not that 11 big in context to the structures we're talking about here, 12 and so it is reasonable to have it be homogeneous. 13 THE COURT: Well, you don't have zones if you 14 treat everything then. 15 MR. ZEULI: That is right. That is one of the 16 principles of how traditional filtration and traditional, 17 conventional swimming pools work is they don't have 18 stagnation zones. It is homogeneous is the word that we typically talk about. 19 20 THE COURT: Well, why worry about zones if you 21 don't have any? 22 MR. ZEULI: Because in these gigantic structures 23 you're going to have an area, and the swimming area would be 24 one example, that is going to be required to meet stricter 25 standards of --

THE COURT: But you're meeting the standards 1 2 through the whole thing. 3 MR. ZEULI: No. THE COURT: You are not? 4 5 MR. ZEULI: You are not. You are treating throughout the whole thing, but 6 7 you do not have to meet the standards throughout the whole 8 thing. So what Mr. Fishman realized is he said, aha -- if 9 you could blow up figure two please, Bill. Okay. 10 I don't have to spend all that money on all that 11 chemistry for treating this entire lagoon if I only have 12 swimming in a particular area. I can comply and spend a lot 13 less money, if you look on the screen, by treating one zone 14 with that chemistry. That is pretty clever. He defined it 15 as such. I mean --16 THE COURT: How do you define the area so that 17 people are aware of it? 18 MR. ZEULI: People don't need to be aware of it. 19 They don't need to know. 20 THE COURT: You can swim anywhere? 21 MR. ZEULI: No, you can't swim anywhere. 22 places --23 THE COURT: How do you tell them not to swim 24 anywhere? 25 MR. ZEULI: So the way that it works at Cloward's

```
lagoon is -- let's bring it up -- let me just find the
 1
 2
             They have got a sign that says don't swim in the
 3
     lagoon.
               It is slide 17, please.
 4
 5
               Bill, if you could just bring up the lower right
 6
     quadrant and just zoom in on that for the Judge.
 7
               That is the sign at Cloward's lagoon.
 8
               THE COURT: What is the sign that you use?
 9
               MR. ZEULI: What is that?
10
               THE COURT: What is the sign that you use to
11
     effect your claim?
12
               MR. ZEULI: Actually this isn't in the claim.
13
     This isn't in the claim and I don't know exactly what signs
14
     they use. It depends on which lagoon you're probably at.
15
     The point is that this invention very cleverly deals with
16
     the situation where you have a massive structure but only a
17
     portion needs to be chemically treated at a certain level.
18
     It all needs to be treated, but only a portion needs to meet
19
     the stricter guidelines and that is what it does and it does
20
     it quite well. The inventor defined it. I mean I have
     never -- yeah, I can't imagine not accepting the inventor's
21
22
     definition.
23
               THE COURT: The definition is there and the law is
24
     what it is.
25
               MR. ZEULI: Yes.
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THE COURT: You can be your own lexicographer, but 1 2 when you provide the definition, you're stuck with it. 3 MR. ZEULI: That is exactly right, for better or for worse. Here it is for better and we take it and we 4 5 shouldn't mess with it. 6 THE COURT: How does it help us at all in the long 7 run? 8 MR. ZEULI: Well, it helps us because what we'll 9 be able to show the Court and the jury is that this is how 10 Cloward addresses its lagoon as well. There is an area that 11 has a higher chemistry. 12 THE COURT: So what? 13 MR. ZEULI: Well, so it infringes that claim. 14 THE COURT: So what? 15 MR. ZEULI: So it infringes the claim. 16 THE COURT: What is wrong with putting up a sign? 17 MR. ZEULI: There is nothing wrong. That actually 18 proves our point and that is the evidence we'll be bringing 19 to you when we show you the factual disputes about whether 20 Cloward treats their lagoon so-called homogeneously or 21 whether there are areas where there are lots more nozzles 22 that put lots more chemistry in there. It infringes. 23 THE COURT: What suggests by way of a legal 24 proposition anywhere that one is required to do anything 25 like that?

MR. ZEULI: I don't understand your question, Your 1 2 Honor. 3 THE COURT: Why have divisions? Why have areas? Why be virtual? 4 5 MR. ZEULI: Cost. Because of the cost. 6 Well, let me take them in order. Why have areas? 7 Because it would be cost prohibitive or considerably more 8 expensive to treat a two, four, 20 or 100-acre lagoon with 9 the chemistry that is required for a swimming area. 10 swimming area might only be, Your Honor --11 THE COURT: Well, why can't everybody do something 12 like that in taking care of the swimming area and provide 13 chemicals? What is so unique about that? 14 MR. ZEULI: What is so unique is it had never been 15 done. Pool technology had always been homogeneous. You 16 treat the whole structure the same. When you expand your 17 thinking into these much, much larger structures, that 18 becomes very cost prohibitive if you have to treat all four 19 million gallons of water. 20 THE COURT: I can't understand the motivation. 21 MR. ZEULI: The patent office looked at it and 22 said, yeah, that is patentable. We're going to give you a 23 patent on that. 24 THE COURT: Well, I would be interested in some 25 law on that and we'll get to that down the road.

MR. ZEULI: Yes.

My only point here is -- I mean it is a pretty neat solution to a problem that was created by having these much larger structures. The patent office thought so and gave them a patent and he defined the term in there.

THE COURT: You're stuck with it.

MR. ZEULI: Yes.

THE COURT: I can understand that.

MR. ZEULI: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else, counselor?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I think there are a couple of brief points.

I completely agree that the patentee has acted as their own lexicographer, but the question that is left ambiguous, even though the patentee has put a definition in there, what is left ambiguous is delimited from what? What we heard was the shuffling of language. I went back and I found the answer to the question what is recreation, because the claims say a portion of water for recreational purposes.

In the 520 patent, and I am here at column two, and the paragraph beginning on line 16, on the second line of that it ends with large water bodies are used for a wide variety of recreational purposes that include bathing, waterskiing, windsurfing, boating and many other activities. So there we know what is meant by recreation.

What you had was a focus on swimming, a subset.

Like, oh, well, this part of the lagoon is for swimming, and then the rest of the lagoon is for kayaking and boating and other stuff.

Well, then there is no portion, no part that is delimited for sanitary compliance and recreation because the whole thing is, and that is what we heard is the whole thing. So the question that is going to come down the line is both on infringement and invalidity of this patent.

THE COURT: Well, the question of validity is an entirely different question.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: It is, but claim construction is a part of that. We construe the claims and we understand what is meant by the claims, and then if something after the patent date does what is said by the claims it infringes, but if there is something before the patent was filed, then it invalidates the patent. You still need to understand the scope of the claims.

THE COURT: Well, that is a different question.

That is different from the meaning of the claim itself.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes, it is, but it answers the Court's question about how is this going to help us down the line, because what is described in the patent as the prior art is the treatment of an entire large body of water, mixing it all up, the whole thing. They say that is prior

art. That is not what we are doing.

I have here again the 520 patent talking about the state of the art. This is in column four, lines 28 through 43. It is talking about the prior art and what has been done before. It talks about this U.S. patent number ending in 268 that discloses a method and apparatus for treatment of large water bodies by direct circulation.

About halfway down it states that the 268 patent does not mention nor disclose a method for treating a portion of water within a large water body in order to comply with specific micro bacteriological sanitary conditions, but only discloses a method for maintaining circulation within a large water body.

The method from the 268 patent does not apply chemicals through diffuser means in order to create a sanitary complaint zone, but maintains circulation within the water body that would disperse chemicals throughout the water body, not allowing the creation of a sanitary compliant zone.

So if you are treating the whole thing, you can't even create this zone. So treatment of everything so that it can be used for recreation would fundamentally destroy the idea of these zones and the potential for any infringement argument.

What I brought up here at the Jewish Community

Center I think is illustrative. There are the creation of zones all over the place, but this pool treats the entire water body, it treats the play area, the zero entry, it treats the shallow end and it treats the deep end where there is no swimming. It treats everything. So there is no sanitary compliant zone. The whole thing is. That is what pools have been doing forever.

The principle, and you remember we talked about humans being dirty and they get in the water, and the principle is where you have more people per unit of water, the more you need to clean it. So hot tubs where you have got people in close quarters sitting together, that is a pretty dirty place, and so you have to circulate that water and clean it a lot quicker to deal with the number of people.

In the shallow end you have a lot more kids playing and splashing around and more people are comfortable in the shallow end even if they can't swim, so there is a higher concentration of bodies. So there is more circulation in the shallow end than there is in the deep end where you don't have a ton of people.

Then in a huge lake you're not filling that lake to the brim with people. There are only a couple of people paddling around out there so you need even less circulation equipment.

It has been a principle of water treatment forever. The Florida Pool Code that predates these patents significantly talks about, hey, if you have one of those zero entry areas where kids are going to be splashing, you need to double your inlets. There is going to be more people, more dirty people so you have to double your circulation equipment in those areas. The Texas code says the same thing.

I look again at the Cant patent and let's take a look at this and see what is happening. You have these evenly spaced inlets from the shallow end down to the deep end, but in the shallow end there is less water so there are more inlets per unit volume of water in the shallow end, as there should be, than in the deep end.

The question we're going to get down the line is we're going to be looking at the Hard Rock lagoon and we're going to be saying, okay, does this only treat this little pocket of water where people swim or does it treat the entire thing?

In the future, and I understand that this is not a thing for today, but here is a picture of the inlets of this lagoon. There are 115 in total. They are all over the place. Like on the south end here, I have outlined in blue a building and this is the south end filter house. This is where everything from the skimmers of the little swimming

bay pocket up on the top and the whole south end of the lake all go back to this filter house. It all gets pushed through the same filters. It all gets pushed through a system that applies the same chlorine and the same chemicals and then it shoots it back out to the entire south end of the lake.

At the north end of the lake, shown on the right, it is the same thing. There is no swimming bay up there, but everything from the north end gets shoved off to the north end mechanical house to be filtered and chemically treated and then shot back into the lake.

So we're going to be addressing this question of where are the zones? What is the zone? We need some sort of certainty about is a delimiting zone a buoy line that says don't swim under the diving board, because if it is, they are going to have massive invalidity problems. If it means delimiting zone based upon where you're treating water and where you are not, then that is going to help us with the infringement question next month.

That is all I had on that term in rebuttal. If the Court does not have questions, I can move on to I think our last sets of terms.

THE COURT: You recognize that if you want to play your own lexicographer, you may?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 2 MR. BRAITHWAITE: I think the last set of terms 3 for the parties are the determining terms. 4 THE COURT: Is that a judgment call or is that a 5 matter of measurement? MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, I think it is a 6 7 matter of measurement based on what is stated in the patents 8 themselves. 9 THE COURT: If it is a matter of measurement, then what is there to construe? 10 11 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, because we apparently have 12 different understandings of the term. It is ambiguous to 13 these parties and we need a decision one way or the other to 14 say, Cloward H20, you're right or you are wrong, so we know 15 which definition we're operating under as we approach these 16 future questions. 17 THE COURT: But you recognize it is a matter of 18 measurement. It is either saline or it is not. MR. BRAITHWAITE: Well, I don't think both parties 19 20 are --21 THE COURT: It is either 98 degrees or it is not. 22 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Correct, Your Honor, but I don't 23 think both parties are operating under the common belief 24 that it is measurement. 25 THE COURT: Well, we'll find out. We'll ask.

1 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. ZEULI: When this building was built there was an engineer that designed -- by the way, congratulations. I 4 5 met Senator Hatch many years ago. He is a fine man and this 6 building is honorably named after him. 7 When this building was designed and before it was 8 named after Senator Hatch, an engineer sat down and 9 determined what the HVAC system should be, and he or she did 10 that because you don't build a building and then go in and stick a probe at the end of the air conditioning duct and 11 12 say, whoops, we got it wrong. 13 The word in the patent claim is determining. 14 is not measure. It is not test. The inventor certainly 15 knew and understood empirical measurements like testing and 16 measuring and spoke about it in his patent, but the word 17 that he chose in the claim is determining. It is a common 18 English word. 19 THE COURT: How do you determine? 20 MR. ZEULI: How do you determine? You can 21 determine a number of different ways. 22 Well, don't you measure in order to THE COURT: 23 determine? 24 MR. ZEULI: That might be one way. 25 THE COURT: Are you measuring two things?

```
MR. ZEULI: Webster's dictionary says determining
 1
 2
     is to find out or come to a decision about by investigation,
 3
     reasoning or calculation.
 4
               THE COURT: Sure. It is a judgment call
 5
     supposedly.
 6
               MR. ZEULI: Not necessarily.
 7
               THE COURT: Well, based on what?
 8
               MR. ZEULI: Based on scientific principles,
 9
     information that can be discerned before you build the
10
     building.
11
               THE COURT:
                                   Sure. But here we're talking
                           Sure.
12
     about what people do in the way of taking temperature.
13
               MR. ZEULI: No, we are not.
14
               THE COURT: Well, you are making a value judgment
15
     in not using the scientific means of determining with
16
     exactitude the temperature. You made a healthy guess rather
17
     than an instrumental measurement.
               MR. ZEULI: Just like in this room it was
18
19
     determined by an engineer what the range of the temperatures
20
     would be. We didn't have to build it and then measure it
21
     and determine that we got it right or wrong.
22
               Now, of course, you would and have a
2.3
     thermometer --
24
               THE COURT: Don't you take the temperature?
25
               MR. ZEULI: Of course.
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THE COURT: And don't you measure the saline
 1
 2
     content?
 3
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, but that is not the only way you
     determine. This goes right --
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Tell me how else you determine.
 6
               MR. ZEULI: An engineer often determines using
 7
     scientific principles like looking up in a handbook as to
 8
     what the salinity of the water in a certain area is by using
 9
     mathematical calculations. When you build a building of a
10
     certain size, for example, what is the amount of airflow
11
     that is required? What do you have to have by way of a
12
     blower and whatnot?
13
               Our point, Your Honor, is that they are trying to
14
     get you to narrow a common English word, determine, to just
15
     testing and --
16
               THE COURT: What are the elements of determine?
17
     You suggest that determine is --
18
               MR. ZEULI: Investigate --
19
               THE COURT: -- unambiguous.
20
               MR. ZEULI: No.
21
                           That it is specific, but it is simple,
               THE COURT:
22
     as I understand your argument.
23
               MR. ZEULI: I think that is right. I think most
24
     people have experience in determining things, and I think
25
     that while it can include, and the patent specifically talks
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about empirical ways, testing and calculation, it is not
 1
 2
     limited to that.
 3
               THE COURT: What function does it serve in this
     particular instance? In relationship to the claim as a
 4
     claim, what function does the determination serve?
 5
               MR. ZEULI: You don't want to build a 40-acre
 6
 7
     structure to the tune of tens of millions of dollars and
 8
     find out that you determined incorrectly the amount of
 9
     saline or the temperature range. That is designed ahead of
10
     time to the structure so that when it is built, you can test
11
     and confirm that it is correct.
12
               THE COURT: I understand that. You test.
13
               MR. ZEULI: You can test to confirm.
14
               THE COURT: And you anticipate in your design a
15
     particular result.
16
               MR. ZEULI: Correct.
17
               THE COURT: But so what?
18
               MR. ZEULI: That is determining. Determination --
19
               THE COURT: At what point in time does
20
     determination take place? Is it in the design?
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, in the design and in the testing
21
22
     after the design is built.
2.3
               THE COURT: It requires testing?
24
               MR. ZEULI: It does not require testing.
                                                          Ιt
25
     requires determining.
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THE COURT: Well, tell me when the determination takes place.

MR. ZEULI: It can occur before when the design is being created.

THE COURT: Now, tell me the nature of the determination that occurs in the design.

MR. ZEULI: If you look on the screen, Your Honor, and this is from the patent and it says, for example, with regard to salinity the dilution power may be previously known. That is known from either handbooks or calculations based on the soil.

THE COURT: Well, you're talking about the manner in which you would diminish the salinity if that is your goal.

MR. ZEULI: I wouldn't agree with that, Your
Honor. Here what the defendant is asking you to do is to
take a word, determining, which is clearly broad enough to
encompass more than just testing and measuring, and chop it
down and say you can only infringe if you test and measure.
They are trying to get rid of the prebuild, the design, the
determining before when you're designing the construction.

THE COURT: Well, you anticipate that your design is going to create a particular level of salinity and you determine that with the use of particular chemicals.

MR. ZEULI: I would disagree with that, Your

1 Honor. I would say that you don't anticipate, you design.
2 It is scientific. It is --

THE COURT: Well, we can talk about scientific.

Tell me the process. Tell me specifically what mental processes are involved in determination.

MR. ZEULI: Sure. If I go back to the definition -- investigation. So let's just take salinity. You can investigate the soil. You can do that obviously with the salinity of the water.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ZEULI: You can investigate before the structure is built the salinity of the water by the soil, by books that have publications, certain cities have publications of what the salinity is of their water. So those are examples of determining that do not require you, the designer, to test or measure.

Now, afterwards, of course Your Honor is right that it could include testing and measuring to see if you got it right. You used the word anticipate. I don't think that is right. I think it is determine. It is an engineer's job and they put a lot of time and a lot of math and a lot of work into it and they come up with a system that they expect based on investigation and reasoning and calculation. That does not require or is not limited to just testing and measuring, which sounds like after the

fact.

THE COURT: Well, how do you verify your determination call, your judgment call? How do you verify that?

MR. ZEULI: Well, you can verify it either through written records as to what the specifications --

THE COURT: No. How do you verify it? Once you have designed and once you have put things in place, how do you verify?

MR. ZEULI: Put a thermostat on the wall.

THE COURT: Sure you do.

MR. ZEULI: Sure. That is included. Absolutely, that is included in determining, but it is not limited to that.

THE COURT: Well, I am trying to figure out and have you identify for me what is in addition to the testing. You say, well, the design, the design. So what? You check out your design by testing, by using the appropriate measuring sticks to measure either the temperature or the chemical content to make sure that people are not harmed, that people are going to be safe. Maybe your design is faulty. Maybe your anticipated action is inappropriate. If we want to distinguish between the thought processes before the testing, then we ought to distinguish that, and when we talk about judgment or talk about determination, we ought to

focus in on time and place and what.

MR. ZEULI: I agree with you.

Let me show you what the patent says. Let's go back to the intrinsic record. On the screen is a snippet from the patent that talks about this. You can see that this has to do with salinity, and what I have underlined at the top with regard to determining says may be previously known. That is a temporal statement. May be previously known.

Now, contrast that with the next words, or empirically determined, may be previously known or empirically determined. So when determined is modified by the adjective or adverb empirically, yes, you can stick a probe in it later and find out if you determined correctly before you built the structure, when you designed the structure. That is what this is talking about because, you know, it would be backwards to design this building or one of these massive lagoons and not determine beforehand what the salinity requirements are going to be.

Yes, you should test it later to make sure that people are safe and that you have determined it correctly, because you may determine it incorrectly, but it does not change the fact that prior to building the structure, in the design phase you are determining, because the definition of determining includes investigation, reasoning or

calculation.

MR. ZEULI: It does not use those exact words, but I would say it is included in this statement that I show on the screen where it says may be previously known. How can something be previously known? Investigation, calculation and --

THE COURT: Where does it say that in the patent?

THE COURT: They watch it on television.

MR. ZEULI: Perhaps. Your Honor, perhaps. Bob the Builder show.

THE COURT: Why is this important at all?

MR. ZEULI: It is not, because what they are trying to get you to do is narrow the term so that Cloward, that is a designer, can argue that, hey, we don't stick a probe in the water.

Now, the fact of the matter is, as we'll show you some day or we'll show the jury, Cloward does stick probes in the water and they do test and they do calculate, but they also determine. This is a common English word. They are asking you, based on nothing from the patent, and they can't show you where in the claim the word test or calculation is. It just says determine. They can't show you in the patent where it says when we say determine, we only mean testing and calculating, because they know that they have got this statement that is on the screen to deal

with. The patent office surely didn't require it. There is no ambiguity here. There is no ambiguity with regard to determine.

There is a dispute factually as to whether they determine, but there is no dispute with regard to the ambiguity of the term determining.

Here is one of the methods, one of the best -THE COURT: Then what are we talking about?

MR. ZEULI: You would have to ask them. They want to create a noninfringement defense where there is none. You know it is so interesting, why determining? Why wouldn't they pick the word minimum? Why wouldn't they pick the word period? They picked determining, a common English word, because if they can get you to narrow it to something that they will claim they don't do, testing and calculation, then they can bring an argument for noninfringement, but that would be wrong.

One of the other pieces of intrinsic evidence,

Your Honor, that is so important is claim 13 in the patent,

and it is on the screen. It specifically is limited to the

empirical methods. That is not the claim we're talking

about. The inventor has the broader claim, number one that

we're talking about that uses the word determine, and then

he wrote a narrower claim that says determined by empirical

methods. We don't assert that claim. We are not asserting

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that claim.
 1
 2
               THE COURT: Have you withdrawn that claim?
 3
               MR. ZEULI: No.
               Actually, I may have misspoken. I think they
 4
 5
     do --
 6
               MR. BRAITHWAITE: No, we don't assert that.
 7
               MR. ZEULI: There are so many claims.
 8
               Right. We have not asserted that claim in this
     case, because this one is narrower and it is limited I would
 9
10
     say to testing and calculation, the empirical methods.
11
     is very strong evidence that the broader claim determining
12
     means what it says, determining, not just testing or
13
     calculation.
14
               THE COURT: Claim one --
15
               MR. ZEULI: Yes.
16
               THE COURT: -- is testing.
17
               MR. ZEULI: No, determining.
               THE COURT: No. Look at claim 13.
18
19
               MR. ZEULI: Uh-huh.
20
               THE COURT: The method of claim one wherein the
     O.R.P. and the salinity and the temperature of the water are
21
22
     determined by empirical methods.
2.3
               Claim one talks about determination, does it not?
24
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, but it --
25
               THE COURT: And this explains the method for
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determining.
 1
 2
               MR. ZEULI: No, Your Honor.
 3
               THE COURT: It says what it says.
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, it does, Your Honor, but remember
 4
 5
     that this claim is not asserted. This claim is --
               THE COURT: Well, it is part of the history of
 6
 7
     this thing.
               MR. ZEULI: No.
 8
 9
               THE COURT: It is part of what is there.
10
               MR. ZEULI: No, Your Honor. It is not. It is
11
     evidence of our position being correct and the defendant's
12
     position being wrong.
13
               THE COURT: You're not asserting that they take
14
     temperature?
15
               MR. ZEULI: We are not asserting this claim.
16
               THE COURT: You are not asserting it. In your
17
     complaint you are not asserting that they take temperature?
18
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, we are.
19
               THE COURT: You are asserting that they take
20
     temperature?
21
               MR. ZEULI: Yes, they take temperature.
22
               THE COURT: Does that include the claim in number
23
     13?
24
               MR. ZEULI: It possibly could.
25
               THE COURT: Sure it could. Sure it could.
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MR. ZEULI: But the point is, Your Honor, that
 1
 2
     this narrower claim 13 is evidence that claim number one,
 3
     which does not limit determining to empirical methods, is
     broader. Because if you said in claim one determining means
 4
 5
     testing and calculation only and those are the empirical
     methods, claim one and 13 would be the same. That would be
 6
 7
     wrong.
 8
               THE COURT: It says the method of claim one -- the
 9
     method of claim one.
10
               MR. ZEULI: I understand, Your Honor, but the way
     that the claim structure works --
11
12
               THE COURT: One of the methods of claim one is
13
     different than the method of claim one.
14
               MR. ZEULI: No. It does not work that way.
15
     does not work that way.
16
               THE COURT: It does not mean --
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               MR. ZEULI: Pardon?
               THE COURT: "The" does not mean "the"? It means
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     everything.
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               MR. ZEULI: It does mean -- let me try it this
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     way. Let me try it this way.
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               Claim one claims a car that has tires, a steering
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     wheel and windshield wipers. Claim 13 says that the car of
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     claim one, wherein the steering wheel is blue. That is
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     strong evidence that claim number one is not limited to a
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blue car steering wheel.

THE COURT: Let's have counsel respond.

MR. ZEULI: Okay.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

To preface this I think I want to go back to the question the Court asked. So what? Why is any of this going to matter?

Here is why it does. Cloward H20 is a collection of a handful of engineers down in Provo, Utah. They sit I think on the second or third floor of a small building down there up against the mountains. They are not in Florida dumping chlorine into a pool. They are not in Florida taking the measurements of a pool. They are architects and engineers that design structures and come home. They are not a pool maintenance company.

What we have in the claims of the 520 patent is as it is titled at the top of the claim one, a method for controlling microbiological properties of a portion of water within a water body. It is not a method for designing and coming up with calculations for form and design. This is talking about actually dipping your sticks into the water, looking at what color they are and whatever measurements you're taking and dumping chlorine in, and that is subsection C of claim one, and it says dispensing an effective amount of chemical agent into the identified

portion of water, and that is not done in design. We're talking about active maintenance on the ground.

So Cloward H20 is sitting here saying why am I accused of patent infringement for a method patent of treating water? We don't do water treatment. We design these structures. The goal was to design something that worked similar to a typical swimming pool that would operate.

The background of swimming pools -- I think a little bit of technology here is potentially useful. What you do with a swimming pool is there is a concept called O.R.P. and it stands for oxidation reduction potential, but in more layman's terms it is the cleaning power of water. So in general, and once you get down into the super scientific level, it is not always true, but in general the more chlorine, the more cleaning power of water and the higher the O.R.P. would be.

Sometimes it depends. It depends on the pH of the water. That can affect the cleaning power of the water and the O.R.P. Typical pool maintenance relies on keeping an O.R.P. level at 650 or above. It depends on the pool and it depends on the location, but you keep a pretty high O.R.P. and you keep it 24-7. It is always maintained. That is why you have lifeguards out there at the swimming pool dipping their sticks in the water to make sure that the water is

still sanitary.

The 520 patent was about something different. In the claims it talks about figuring out how low you can go. What is the minimum O.R.P. level that we can maintain and still be sanitary? What is the minimum amount of time that we need to treat the water and still be sanitary? That is what subsection B of claim one goes to. It says maintaining at least a minimum O.R.P. level in the portion of water for at least a minimum period of time, wherein the minimum O.R.P. level and the minimum period of time cannot be lower than the values calculated by, and then it gives your determination step. It is talking about calculation.

In subset B-1 it says determine the salinity of the water at the most unfavorable zone. Actually go do it. Put a salinity meter in the water. What is the salinity? Then use that value to determine the minimum O.R.P. It says in subsection little ii, Romanette ii, determining the minimum O.R.P. value based upon the salinity of the water, the thing you determine, and for salinities of water between zero and 1.5 percent use a minimum O.R.P. of 550. For salinities of water between 1.5 and 2.5, plug your salinity value into this equation and that is going to help you figure out the minimum period of time.

For salinities higher than 2.5, the minimum O.R.P. is 500, but that is always below the typical O.R.P. level of

a regular swimming pool that is maintained 24-7. A typical swimming pool is 650 all the time. They are saying, well, if the water is salty, then you can get away with less cleaning power of the water, get away with a lower O.R.P., but you have to do these determination steps to figure out what that is.

Then the next step is to figure out how long to maintain that low level of cleaning power. So you determine the temperature of the water, not in general, in the most unfavorable zone. Someone needs to go out and do it. They need to figure out what is the worst part of the water and what is the temperature in the worst part of the water, and then determine the minimum period of time based upon that temperature using, again, a set of recited equations. For temperatures between five Celsius and 35 Celsius, there is one equation, and for temperatures between 35 Celsius and 45 Celsius, there is another equation. So you have to actually do this stuff.

Now, the reality is that in designing a typical pool or in designing the Hard Rock Hotel lagoon, you don't care about the temperature and salinity, because you're going to maintain that high O.R.P. of 650 or above permanently, 24-7, and you always want to maintain it everywhere that high. So you're not worried about taking the temperature.

If it is a cold pool, 60 degrees, high O.R.P. It does not matter. Who cares about the temperature. If it is a really warm pool, 95 degrees. It does not matter, high O.R.P. all the time. Temperature does not come into it in the design or in the actual maintenance, which is what is claimed here.

The same is true with salinity. If there happens to be more salt in the water coming from the well, maintain the high O.R.P. Maintain it all the time. If it is low salinity coming from the well, high O.R.P. all the time and nobody cares about the salinity.

What the accusation has been and the reason that this case is being brought against a few engineers in Provo, Utah, that aren't touching the water anymore, is they want to say, well, someone could go and determine the temperature. It is possible to figure it out. If it is 70 degrees outside for multiple days, then the water is going to be near that. The salinity you just generally know and no one has to really do anything.

If we take the patent and we say, well, determination just requires that you could figure it out, that you could look it up in a book, then everything collapses down to treating the water with chlorine in a 2012 patent. That is ridiculous and no person of skill in the art would approach this patent and think, well, Crystal

Lagoons got a patent on treating water with chlorine. That is not a reasonable interpretation of these claims.

We have asked the Court to not just say what the word determining means, but, instead, we're asking the Court about the full phrase determining the salinity of the water at the most unfavorable zone. What is within the scope of that is just the water having salinity good enough or does someone actually have to do something? The claims make it clear that they do, because they have got to take their value and plug it into an equation to figure out how long to treat the lagoon.

There is another portion of the specification that also draws this out and it is similar to the slide that counsel for Crystal Lagoons showed the Court.

THE COURT: Why is it ambiguous?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: It is ambiguous because of how it is being asserted. It is ambiguous because of how it is being asserted. You have counsel for Crystal Lagoons come up here and say, well, it does not mean that you have to do anything. It could just be known in the esoteric and ethereal sense. It is just known. That is not what determining means.

Let's look at the specification. This is from column 15, lines 22 through 33, and it specifically talks about how salinity and temperature can be determined. This

is almost like the patentee being their own lexicographer.

It says the salinity can be determined by empirical or analytical methods such as a visual test, salinometers, I think is how you say that, that are based on the conductivity of the electricity in the water, hydrometers that are based on the specific gravity of the water, or refractometers that are based on the index of refraction of the water. Apart from determining by empirical or analytical methods, it then says apart from being determined they might be publicly known or can be information from other sources.

So if you're getting it from some public knowledge or information from other sources, but you're not determining by empirical or analytical methods, then you're not doing the determination. Just being known the spec says is not determination.

The same thing is true with temperature. That same setup is there. The temperature of the water can be determined by empirical or analytical methods such as visual tests, thermometers, thermocouples, resistance temperature detectors, pyrometers or infrared devices or may be publicly known. So apart from being determined it could also be publicly known. That is not part of determination. That is just being known in some ethereal sense.

That is what we're asking the Court to resolve is

do these terms about determining the minimum O.R.P. values actually require what they say or is it just some theoretical exercise in the ether, because if it is some theoretical exercise in the ether, then, great, we know how we can invalidate the claims with the simple chlorination of water which has been going on forever.

If these steps actually have to be performed and they actually have to be performed by Cloward H20, then there is zero evidence of that happening, because they are designers and architects and not water maintenance providers and we can deal with that issue on summary judgment.

THE COURT: Tell me why the claim is not clear in your mind.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the reason we have asked for claim construction and it is not clear is because of the strange way that Crystal Lagoons is asserting it. We have people sitting on chairs in Provo, Utah that are being accused of maintaining water on the Seminole Reservation in Florida by supposedly performing this determining step. It seems unclear, because whatever understanding they are operating under is so odd and esoteric that it cannot be possible. So it is unclear what their understanding is.

As for the claim itself and what reasonable people would think, the claim is clear as day. You have got to perform those steps. You have got to do those equations and

if you don't, you don't infringe.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we'll let counsel respond.

MR. ZEULI: I think what we have here, Your Honor, is a factual dispute. You asked Mr. Braithwaite twice tell me what is ambiguous about the word determining. He did not provide you an answer other than to say we disagree with how Crystal Lagoons is applying that term. That is not a dispute over language. That is a dispute over factual matters with regard to infringement, and apparently factual matters with regard to invalidity, and that is fine and we will someday have that discussion with regard to whether in fact Cloward's engineers determine.

Bill, can you bring up claim one of the 520 patent? I want to point out something to the Judge first.

One of the things that Mr. Braithwaite said that I think makes the point I just made clear -- Bill, if you can blow up the first two -- no. Excuse me. The first two lines of number one. Right here, if you can see my finger. Make that bigger, please. Thank you. Perfect. There you go. Make that as big as you can.

When Mr. Braithwaite was trying to answer your question about what is ambiguous about the word determining, he said, you know, the engineers in Provo are being accused of sitting in their chairs and maintaining the lagoon in

Florida, but that is not what this claim says. This claim says a method for controlling microbiological properties.

Method for controlling. That gets to my whole point.

I think Your Honor has grasped the temporal issue here, which is can determining as part of controlling the chemistry in a lagoon be done during the design? The answer is absolutely.

Now, this gets into factual things, but I am going to show it anyway because Mr. Braithwaite mentioned it.

Bring up the purple and orange photo.

One of the ways that that is done is by putting more nozzles in certain areas. That comes from the design. So this is part of the design of the lagoon at a Hard Rock Hotel. You can see that the Cloward designers in Provo, Utah created many more inlets in the swimming area than they did in the rest of the lagoon. So that is a determination as to the microbiological content in that lagoon. Of course it is going to be measured later to confirm. You called it an assumption. I call it determining. That determination will be confirmed, but it can be done temporally before and that is why there is nothing wrong with the word determining.

Bill, finally if you could just bring up column 11 of the 520 patent, lines 22 to 33.

Again, going back to the intrinsic evidence, we

asked ourselves where is the ambiguity? Is the claim ambiguous? No, it is not. It uses the word determine, a common word and easy to understand. There may be a dispute as to application, but that is not for today. Nothing in the file history. The patent owner didn't say anything. Can we use sticking a probe in there? So Mr. Braithwaite is left with trying to find something in the specification, but it is not there.

Bill, if you could blow up column 11, lines 22 to 33. Blow up is not a very technical term. 22 to 33. There we go. Try one more time.

I am sorry. Maybe I have this wrong. Maybe it is column 15, lines 22 to 33. It is what Mr. Braithwaite had on the screen a moment ago.

I apologize, Your Honor.

Keep going. 22 to 33. There we go. There it is. Good.

So what Mr. Braithwaite had you focus on was the fact that in the patent specification -- it does not say it has to be this way. It says can be. If you're looking for a disclaimer where you would change the word determining to mean something narrower, you would have to see, like, must, always, and you don't. It just says can be determined. So it says one way you can do it and then he listed off all these fancy science gadgets. That is fine and good.

What he left off was at the bottom where it says or may be publicly known, right, and that is certainly temporally before. You wouldn't have public knowledge -- you know, there is no public knowledge of what the temperature is in this room. That public knowledge as to what the temperature should be in this room would have been before this room was designed. Or it can be information from other sources, among others, calculations, engineering books.

The same thing with temperature. Mr. Braithwaite talked about all these fancy science instruments. I am not even going to try to pronounce them. He left off the end where it says or may be publicly known or can be informed from other sources.

THE COURT: The universe of other subjects -- you know, I am always amazed at the redundancy that occurs in matters of this kind, but I think you made your point, but I think that we'll probably indicate that no construction is necessary at this point in reference to that particular matter.

MR. ZEULI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What is left, if anything?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I think those are all the terms,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. You have got a pending motion

you tell me and it may or may not be the subject of reconsideration by you after the determinations that have been made today, but I will not worry about that. That is your problem. If there is a response down the road, we'll set it down. Maybe we have set it down already. I don't know whether we fixed a date already.

Eventually we're going to get to pretrial, and I want to emphasize in reference to pretrial, disputed issues identified, both legal and legal propositions, a roster of all of your witnesses for your respective cases in chief, not rebuttal, cases in chief, a roster of all of your exhibits for your respective cases in chief. If you have common exhibits, you ought to work together to get them in without worrying about foundation if they are offered by both sides.

Have we yet fixed a pretrial date? We have, have we not?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: No, Your Honor, we have not.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me the date that you have for your motion.

MR. BRAITHWAITE: Your Honor, the pending motion right now is set for October 7th, I believe.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's deal with that, and either deal with that beforehand or deal with that, and on that date we'll give you a pretrial date at that time. But

in anticipation of the fact that we're moving ahead as best we can with the resurge, think about what generally is in dispute and think about what witnesses are going to be helpful to us and who knows what. Think about exhibits.

Anything else that we need to talk about at this point?

MR. BRAITHWAITE: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

MR. ZEULI: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks a lot. Appreciate your help.

It is an interesting case it seems to me. I think the whole relationship of language and the law and how language functions is intimately tied in with what we're trying to do as best we can, but language itself has inherent defects, and I think it is appropriate in cases of this kind that we try to get behind dealing with language and look at the events, what is done and what has happened and who did what on an item specific basis so that we are not just discussing philosophically what is going on in the world.

I think people should be awfully careful about how they run up and down the level of abstraction that people enjoy dealing with. Lawyers love to deal with high-level abstractions. I think, as a practical matter, all of us need to deal with specificity and simplicity and identity with an accurate label of what it is that we're talking about, in spite of the fancy rules that may exist. The

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specificity of specific things is going to be terribly
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     important in my opinion. Quite frankly, high-level
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     abstractions just don't cut it.
                Thank you for your help.
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                We'll be in recess and we'll see you down the
 6
     road.
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                MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.
                THE COURT: Okay.
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                (Proceedings concluded.)
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